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Sustainment constitutes 70% or more of the total life-cycle cost of many safety-,
mission- and infrastructure-critical systems. Prediction and control of the life-cycle cost is
an essential part of all sustainment contracts. For many types of systems, availability is
the most critical factor in determining the total life-cycle cost of the system. To address
this, availability-based contracts have been introduced into the governmental and non-
governmental acquisitions space (e.g., energy, defense, transportation, and healthcare).
However, the development, implementation, and impact of availability requirements within
contracts is not well understood.
This dissertation develops a decision support model based on contract theory, formal
modeling and stochastic optimization for availability-based contract design. By adoption
and extension of the “availability payment” concept introduced for civil infrastructure
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and pricing for Performance-Based Logistics (PBL)
contracts, this dissertation develops requirements that maximizes the outcome of contracts
for both parties.
Under the civil infrastructure “availability payment” PPP, once the asset is available
for use, the private sector begins receiving a periodical payment for the contracted number
of years based on meeting performance requirements. This approach has been applied to
highways, bridges, etc. The challenge is to determine the most effective requirements,
metrics and payment model that protects the public interest, (i.e., does not overpay the
private sector) but also minimizes that risk that the asset will become unsupported. This
dissertation focuses on availability as the key required outcome for mission-critical systems
and provides a methodology for finding the optimum requirements and optimum payment
parameters, and introduces new metrics into availability-based contract structures.
In a product-service oriented environment, formal modeling of contracts (for both the
customer and the contractor) will be necessary for pricing, negotiations, and transparency.
Conventional methods for simulating a system through its life cycle do not include the
effect of the relationship between the contractor and customer. This dissertation integrates
engineering models with the incentive structure using a game theoretic simulation, affine
controller design and stochastic optimization. The model has been used to explore the
optimum availability assessment window (i.e., the length of time over which availability
must be assessed) for an availability-based contract.
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Understanding the total life-cycle cost is an essential part of pricing for any procure-
ment/sustainment acquisition or service contract. For many safety-, mission- and infra-
structure-critical systems, availability is an important factor in determining the life-cycle
cost. Common wisdom is that higher reliability and more efficient supply-chain manage-
ment improves the availability of systems; however, it is also important to explore how
availability drives system and supply-chain attributes. For example, how can the contractor
establish efficient and cost-effective management approaches given specific availability
requirements? What are the methodologies and quantitative methods for designing an
availability requirement in an optimum way? This chapter addresses the current state of
knowledge by reviewing: 1) the definitions and existing approaches used to design and
plan for availability contracts; and 2) the associated approaches for decision modeling for
sustainment acquisition. Chapter 2 addresses the challenges, gaps and opportunities for
new research in this area, followed by the formal problem statement.
1.1 Introduction to Availability-Based Contracts
A significant shift toward a service-based economy has forced organizations to modify their
business philosophy from product-centric to service-oriented through out-sourcing logistics
and maintenance (Baines et al., 2009). Outcome-based contracts that pay for effectiveness
and penalize performance shortcomings have been introduced and referred to as pay-per-
hour or performance-based contracts, e.g., performance-based logistics (PBL) contracts
used by the United States Department of Defense (DoD), and “availability contracting
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maintenance model” initiated by Rolls-Royce (Bangemann et al., 2006). These concepts
are also being used for federal acquisition of healthcare (Eijkenaar et al., 2013), energy,
infrastructure, and in other sectors. Outcome-based contracts allow customers to pay only
for the specific outcomes achieved rather than workmanship and materials delivered. One
of the merits of outcome-based contracts is the optimally sharing of risks by both parties.
These contracts present a pricing challenge due to a dramatic alteration of the risk sharing
scheme when compared to conventional contracts like fixed-price or cost-plus (Kim et al.,
2007). Underestimating the risks involved and therefore the contract cost have caused
some projects to stop and given rise to doubts about the applicability of this class of policy
for new acquisition contracts (Thompson, 2010). The challenge also exists for designing
availability requirements given uncertainties in both inputs and outcomes over a long time
of period. This issue has been largely ignored for a several reasons: 1) availability-based
contracts are a relatively new concept and there is not enough historical data to evaluate
their effectiveness and the success of contractors that implement them; 2) the engineering
design process does not directly target the availability (or other contractual outcomes), but
rather focuses on immediate preferences like performance, purchase price; 3) the logistics
and maintenance of the system are planned and executed separately from the design of
the system (often as an afterthought); 4) design methodologies are not equipped to handle
availability and other outcomes as design inputs; and 5) usage behavior and incentives
for maintenance contractors are being neglected in most design cases due to the high
level of uncertainty in the operational phase of the life cycle. An integrated approach that
includes supply chain, inventory and maintenance management to enable direct evaluation
of different contracting and support policies is needed.
The next section provides a simple qualitative example that demonstrates how an
availability-based contract could work (many variations are possible and in use today). It
describes who the parties to the contract are and how the contract agreement is transacted
between them. After the example, the remainder of this chapter describes and defines the
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main elements of availability-based contracts from the viewpoint of the contractor and the
customer. It explains the most important factors involved in designing availability-based
contracts and how this class of contracts can effectively improve the preparedness and cost
effectiveness of sustainment activities if the design issues are addressed.
1.2 Availability Contract Examples
This section focuses on a simplistic case that addresses the practical aspects of availability-
based contracts. We assume that there is a costumer that uses parts from an inventory
and the contract governs the availability level of the inventory of these parts, where the
inventory is operated (managed) by a contractor (who is not the customer).
In the simplest version of this problem, we assume that the objective of the contractor
is to minimize their costs. We also assume that the customer owns the inventory facility
and the contractor will pay for the use of the space that the parts inventory occupies.1 The
availability contract articulates a penalty that is imposed on the contractor if the availability
of the inventory drops below a certain level. As described, this example is a simplified
version of Performance Based Logistics (PBL) that is currently implemented by the US
DoD. In our simple example, we do not consider any profit-sharing between the contractor
and the customer, but interested readers should see (Hamidi et al., 2014).
In order for the customer to enforce the inventory availability requirement in the
contract, there have to be assessments. An assessment is defined as checking the perfor-
mance of the contractor based on the predefined metrics (e.g., reliability, inventory level
and back-orders) and we assume that at each assessment point the customer can terminate
the contract if the performance of the contractor does not meet the criteria specified in the
contract.
1 In this simple example we will assume that the contractor buys the parts (i.e., the inventory) from an
OEM and the contractor owns the parts forever (even after the customer takes the parts from the inventory
and puts them into their system). For real-world contracts, the actual ownership of the inventory depends on
the particular situation and the contract.
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We assume that during the period of contract (the length of time covered by the
contract), there will be 𝑁𝑎 assessments. At each assessment the performance of the
contractor will be measured; based on the results of the assessment, the customer’s payment
to the contractor could be adjusted (penalized or incentivized).2 Therefore, the contractor
needs to adjust their planning horizon around the periods associated with the assessments.
Everything in this contract costs the contractor money. The contractor must pay to
hold the parts in inventory, order additional parts, tie up capital in the parts, for delays caused
by back-orders, and the penalties assessed on the contractor by the customer. But it will be
the customer that pays for the cost of assessing the contractor performance (GAO-02-1049,
2002; GAO-05-966, 2005). This assessment can be done on a regular basis or randomly
by a performance review unit consisting of both parties (e.g., performance review board).
This example is a simplified version of an availability-based contract, many PBL
contracts operate similarly to this example. There are many variations of this in use today
and just about every availability-based contract is unique (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2006). In
the next subsection, a particular availability contract is described.
1.2.1 Michelin Tire/US Navy Contract
In this subsection, we describe a a real-world example of availability-based contracting.
The example is a contract between US Navy (the customer) and Michelin Aircraft Tire
Co, LLC (MATC) (the contractor) associated with sustaining the aircraft tires used by U.S.
Navy over a wide range of aircraft including F-14, F-18, and A-4. MATC uses Lockheed
Martin as a sub-contractor for supply-chain management. The goal of the US Navy is to
improve the availability (more exactly, the fill-rate) while reducing the inventory level.
The availability-based contract is used to guarantee aircraft fleet readiness and reduce the
logistics cost to the customer. The primary metrics are the fill-rate and reliability of the tires.
The decision to repair/replace is done based on (MIL-PRF-7726K, 2007) for repairable tires
2In some PBL contracts, the customer may also have the flexibility to cancel the contract, replace the
contactor with another contractor, or take over the operation themselves.
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and (MIL-PRF-5041K, 1998) for new tires. The contract requires that MATC fills 95% of
the tire requisitions within 2 working days in the continental United States and 4 working
days outside of the continental United States. The length of the contract is five years with
two five-year extension options. Fill-rate is defined as the number of requisitions filled
within the time criteria divided by the total number of requisitions during a measurement
period. Measurement periods are defined as increments of 6 months starting at the contract
award.
In terms of the scope of operation of the contractor, the “baseline requirements” of the
Michelin contract asks for an “Intermediate to Depot” maintenance concept. Maintenance
operations of an organization are generally divided into three types: 1) organizational-
level maintenance, which are maintenance activities performed directly on a system or its
support equipment (e.g., repair, inspection, testing or calibration); 2) intermediate-level
maintenance, which is done on removed component parts or equipment at a “shop”; and
3) depot-level maintenance, which is done at a major repair facility (Dulcos & Shepherd,
1991). If a malfunction is diagnosed in a system, the malfunctioning item is removed from
the system and brought to the base supply. If a spare is available it is installed in the system;
otherwise a back-order is established for that item. Because this item is directly installed
in the system, the back-order implies that there is a “hole” in the system that causes it to be
non-operational. In our example the fill-rate is measured at the intermediate to depot level
and the back-order does not imply a “hole” in the system, but rather a shortage of parts in
the inventory.
The payments in this contract are based on Annual Firm Fixed Pricing for Level
of Performance addressing operations to support a forecasted demand over a fifteen-year
period to include a five-year base period, and two five-year options. The contractor bills
the Government monthly for 1/12th of the estimated annual cost.
One significant challenge in these availability-contracts is that the period of perfor-
mance (the assessment period) is arbitrary, i.e., not based on any carefully constructed
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analysis, but rather probably determined by convenience or based on what was done in
previous contracts. For example in Section 1.2.1 the assessment period is bi-annual. This
dissertation addresses the optimization of the period of performance assessment in these
contracts.
1.3 Desired Outcome/Performance Measure: Availability
Outcomes can be divided into performance and availability. Figure 1. The concept of
availability is important as it accounts for both the frequency of the failure (reliability)
and the ability to restore the service or system to operation after a failure (maintainabil-
ity). In industries with complex systems for which product downtime has a very high
cost, availability is often the single most driver of total life-cycle cost. The maintenance
ramifications translate into how quickly the failure can be isolated, and the system can be
repaired and/or restored. These tasks are usually driven by fault detection, isolation and
prognosis followed by inventory response.
Figure 1: Categorization of contractual outcomes
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Availability is the probability that the system is operating properly when it is re-
quired for use. In other words, availability is the probability that a system is not failed
or undergoing a repair action when it needs to be used. The definition of availability is
somewhat flexible, depending on what types of downtimes are considered in the analysis.
As a result, there are a number of different types of availability, point (instantaneous)
availability, mean availability, steady-state availability, operational availability, interval
availability, and materiel (inventory) availability, network availability, fleet availability
and layered availability. It needs to be noted that availability-based contracts do not differ-
entiate between sources of success in the outcomes making it difficult to identify the effect
of using such contracts on reliability improvement (Newsome, 2008; U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2008).
1.3.1 Point Availability
Point (or instantaneous) availability is the probability that a system (or component) will
be operational at any time, 𝑡. Point availability is similar to reliability in that it gives the
probability that a system has no failures in the interval from 0 to 𝑡. Unlike reliability, the
point availability measure incorporates maintainability information. At any given time 𝑡,
the system will be operational if the following conditions are met: it functioned properly
during the time interval from 0 to 𝑡 with probability 𝑅(𝑡), and, it functioned properly since




𝑅(𝑡 − 𝑢)𝑚(𝑢) 𝑑𝑢 (1)
in which 𝑅(𝑡) is the reliability of the system at time 𝑡 and 𝑚(𝑢) is the renewal density
function of the system. The point availability is the summation of these two probabilities,
or:
𝐴(𝑡) = 𝑅(𝑡) +􏾙
𝑡
0
𝑅(𝑡 − 𝑢)𝑚(𝑢) 𝑑𝑢 (2)
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𝐴(𝑡) = 𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑅(𝑡 − 𝑢) (3)
1.3.2 Mean Availability
The mean availability is the proportion of time during a mission or time-period that the
system is available for use. It represents the mean value of the point availability function















Operational availability is a measure of the availability that includes all experienced sources






where the operating cycle is the overall period, time, term of operation being investigated
and uptime is the total time the system was functioning during the operating cycle. When
there is no logistic downtime or preventive maintenance specified, the operational availabil-
ity equation returns the mean availability of the system. The system’s availability measure
approaches the operational availability as more sources of downtime are specified, such
as crew logistic downtime, spares logistic downtime, restock logistic downtime, etc. In
all other cases, the availability measure is the mean availability. Note that the operational
availability is the availability that the customer experiences. It is essentially a posteriori
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availability based on actual events that happened to the system. Operational availability can
be effectively estimated by accumulating times in discrete-event simulators. The previous
availability definitions are priori estimations based on models of the system failure and
downtime distributions. In many cases, operational availability cannot be controlled by
the manufacturer due to variation in location, resources and other factors that are the sole
province of the end user of the product.
1.3.5 Interval Availability
Interval availability is the fraction of time the system is operational during a given interval
of time. When there the focus is on the transient behavior of a system or continuous demand,
the interval availability is a relevant measure. For instance, the amount of crude oil or
natural gas to be delivered over a finite period requires related platforms to be available for
a certain number of hours in that window. Figure 2 shows that depending on the interval;
the availability can vary greatly within the intervals, while still resulting in the same overall
availability.
Figure 2: Interval availability with different intervals
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1.3.6 Materiel Availability
Materiel availability is a measure of the fraction of the total inventory of a system oper-
ationally capable of performing (ready for tasking) an assigned mission at a given time,
based on the materiel condition. Materiel availability can be expressed mathematically as
(the number of operational end items divided by the total population).3 Determining the
optimum value for materiel availability requires a comprehensive analysis of the system and
its planned use, including the planned operating environment, operating tempo, reliability
alternatives, maintenance approaches, and supply-chain solutions. Materiel availability
is primarily determined by system downtime, both planned and unplanned, requiring the
early examination and determination of critical factors, such as the total number of end
items to be fielded and the major categories and drivers of system downtime. The materiel
availability key performance parameter must address the total population of end items
planned for operational use, including those temporarily in a non-operational status once
placed into service (such as for depot-level maintenance).
Materiel availability can be expressed in different ways. The following definition
represents a point (instantaneous) estimate for materiel availability as a measure, expressed
as a fraction of systems (end items).
Materiel Availability (𝐴𝑚) =
Number of Operational End Items
Total Population
(7)
The key elements that must be incorporated in any assessment of 𝐴𝑚 are: any measure of
𝐴𝑚 must include the total population of systems (end items) to be fielded; any measure of
𝐴𝑚 must consider the total life-cycle timeframe of the system (end item); and any measure
of 𝐴𝑚 must include all major categories of downtime, both planned and unplanned. These
are the distinguishing features of the materiel availability metric that differentiate it from
the more familiar operational availability metric (uptime/uptime downtime).
3Note, this is the same definition as “yield”, however, yield refers to the outcome of a manufacturing
process.
10
Figure 3: Materiel availability, state of the system & interval availability
As the Figure 3 depicts, it is clear how 𝐴𝑚 differs from 𝐴𝑜 as it applies to the
number of units in the entire fielded inventory of systems, over the entire life cycle of the
system and incorporates all categories of downtime. In fact, uptime and downtime of an
inventory can be defined based on the level of available inventory or materiel availability
as well. However, the best way to view the relationship between 𝐴𝑚 and 𝐴𝑜 is to see
𝐴𝑚 as a function of 𝐴𝑜, together with many other variables. The best way to assess both
𝐴𝑚 and 𝐴𝑜 is through comprehensive modeling and simulation. Materiel reliability is the
cornerstone that insures both𝐴𝑚 and𝐴𝑜 requirements can be met. 𝐴𝑚 is far more important
in determining the level of availability that is achievable than any other component of
logistics system (“Materiel Availability”, 2010).
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1.3.7 Service level requirements
Service level is commonly used in supply chain management and inventory management
to measure the performance of inventory replenishment policies. Several definitions of
service levels are used in the literature as well as in practice. We introduce the two main
definitions that are related to Materiel Availability.
𝛼-service level (type I)
The 𝛼-service level is an event-oriented performance criterion. It measures the probability
that all customer orders arriving within a given time interval will be completely delivered
from stock on hand, i.e. without delay.
Two versions are discussed in the literature differing with respect to the time interval
within which the orders arrive. With reference to a demand period, 𝛼 denotes the probability
that an arbitrarily arriving customer order will be completely served from stock on hand,
i.e. without an inventory-related waiting time:
𝑆𝛼 = Pr(Period Demand < Inventory on hand at the beginning of period)
In order to determine the safety stock that guarantees a target service level, the stationary
probability distribution of the inventory on hand must be known. This version of 𝛼 is also
called the ready rate.
𝛽−service level (type II)
The 𝛽-service level is a quantity-oriented performance measure describing the proportion
of total demand within a reference period that is delivered without delay from stock on
hand:
𝑆𝛽 = 1 −
Expected backorder per time period
Expected period Demand
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This is equal to the probability that an arbitrary demand unit is delivered without delay.
Because, contrary to the variations of the 𝛼-service level, the 𝛽-service level does
not only reflect the stockout event but also the amount backordered, it is widely used in
industrial practice. For example, if customer orders total 1000 units, and you can only
meet 900 units of that order, your 𝛽-service level is 90%. It is also being called the fill rate.
The time-period in this definition is assumed to be sufficiently large enough to
capture a single order cycle. For example, a monthly fill-rate can be defined as:
Monthly Fill-rate =
Quantity Ordered per Month − Quantity Backordered per Month
Quantity Ordered per Month
Also, by the definition, 𝑆𝛼 ≤ 𝑆𝛽 whenever the probability of zero demand equals 0.
1.3.8 Network Availability, Fleet Availability, Layered Availability
Network services are distributed across several nodes and can depend on the performance of
each node and the demand on each node. Defining and measuring availability requirements
for networked systems or fleets in a way that satisfies the ultimate goal of the customer
(e.g., preparedness) is not trivial (Immonen & Niemelä, 2008). Difficulties defining and
measuring availability metrics makes it even more difficult to predict the availability over
a fleet or network of subsystems and parts (Mickens & Noble, 2006). Targeting availability
in different layers of the system increases the dimension of the problem, and this problem
commonly is called fleet availability.
In summary, one should ask why availability is being used in performance-based
contracts instead of other performance metrics or why it is being distinguished as a special
performance metric from other metrics? Availability along with technical performance,
cost and process efficiency are key elements of support effectiveness. Availability is often
an observable and measurable index, especially for a combination of multiple complex sub-
systems (i.e., system of systems). One can combine the availability of different subsystems
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to achieve the availability of the platform and the reverse can also be done under certain
conditions. In service contracts for complex systems, availability may be a less ambiguous
factor to rely upon to reward the effectiveness of the efforts of the contractors. Availability
is also directly connected to reliability and the quality of support, whereas performance is
highly affected by the users of the system and the engineering design philosophy. Lastly,
when aiming to maintain fleet-level preparedness, availability is more closely connected to
sustainment contractors.
1.4 Performance Evaluation and Performance Sampling Procedures
In availability-based maintenance contracts, customers (e.g., road administrators, the DoD,
etc.) define performance measures that specify the minimum condition to which the asset
items must be maintained. To ensure that contractors maintain the asset items according
to these measures, customers must design and implement a comprehensive and reliable
performance monitoring process.
One of the most important areas within the performance monitoring process is
inspection conducted in the field. Defining a procedure that guarantees the success of field
inspections is a challenge. There are generally two categories of performance sampling:
deterministic and statistical.
Deterministic sampling involved looking at the performance at the end of some
contractual period and determining the payment based on the relationship between payment
and performance. In statistical sampling, for example in a performance-based maintenance
of a highway, the customer can only sample the quality of pavement a few times and in
a few places (Ozbek & Jesus, 2007). Based on this concept, Pinero (2003) developed a
statistical sampling procedure to ensure that findings from field inspections will be reliable
and representative, with high confidence, of the condition of asset items in the entire
population.
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1.4.1 Analysis and Modeling of Time-Correlated Failures
The majority of existing reliability-based work assume failures are identically, and in-
dependently distributed. This assumption does not take into account the time-varying
behavior of failures, the periodic behavior of failures and peak periods in the number
of failures over time(Carroll et al., 2015). The presence of time correlations between
failures including periods with increased failure rate, rejects this assumption and can have a
significant impact on the effectiveness of the maintenance optimization, or fault-tolerance
strategy (Yigitbasi et al., 2010). Understanding the temporal correlations and exploiting
them for optimum checkpointing and scheduling decisions provides new opportunities for
enhancing conventional maintenance optimization and contract design.
1.5 Contract Mechanism: Performance-Based Contracting (PBC)
Performance-based contracting (also referred to as performance-based life cycle product
support and performance-based logistics (PBL)) refers to a group of strategies for sys-
tem support that instead of contracting for goods and services, the contractor delivers
performance outcomes as defined by performance metric(s) for a system or product. PBC
thinking is reflected in a famous quote from Theodore Levitt (Levitt, 1972): “The cus-
tomer does not want a drilling machine; he wants a hole-in-the-wall.” PBC and similar
outcome-based contracts (Table 1.1) pay for effectiveness (availability, readiness and/or
other related performance measures) at a fixed rate, penalize performance shortcomings,
and/or award gains beyond target goals. Table 1.1 describes outcome-based contracts in
terms of incentives and payment models.
PBL is the purchase of support as an integrated, affordable, performance package
designed to optimize system readiness and meet performance goals for the system through
long-term support.
The top-level metric objectives are operational availability, reliability, cost per unit,
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Table 1.1: Contract Types Based on Incentive Structure
Contract Type Criteria Taxonomy
Conventional Contract
(Labor/Material/Hour)
This is a conventional
contract, the customer
pays for the cost of
material, labor and hours
of performance that the
contractor reports
There is no incentive for
contractor to optimize their
operation or minimize
their costs.





first best cost reduction
effort, they are
incentivized to reduce cost
as much as possible.
The rigidity of this
mechanism fails to control
costs, or help the
contractor to deal with the
risks and uncertainties
involved, specially in
R&D projects, and instead
produces expensive legal
battles.
Cost-Plus Award Fee (CPAF) Customer pays a fee
including an award amount
to motivate contractor to
achieve a certain objective.
It should be possible to
determine the feasible
level of objective before
the contract.
Supplier tries to increase
the cost as much as
possible. Predetermined
award fee based on
judgmental evaluation of
the contract.
Cost-Plus Incentive Fee The legal agreement
specifies a target cost, base
contractor pay, a formula
to be used to figure the
incentive bonus, and
minimum and maximum
limits on the contractor’s
pay.
The supplier exerts no cost
reduction, and is




logistics footprint and logistics response time. This level of support differs from the ‘best
effort’ approach typical of DoD organic support in terms of having a clear delineation
of performance outcome. Under PBL (also called Contract for Availability-CfA), the
contractor (system supporter) often commits to providing the current performance level
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at a lower cost, or increased performance at a cost similar to that previously achieved
under a non-PBL approach (Gruneberg et al., 2007). This concept is known in practice as
”Performance Contracting” (Hansen, 2006), “Availability Contracting” (Cushway, 2006),
Contract for Availability (CfA) (Hockley et al., 2011), “Performance-Based Logistics”
in the defense context and “ Performance-Based Service Acquisition (PBSA)” (Gansler,
2000). In the U.S. performance-based logistics is normally established on a contractual
basis, whereas in Europe PBL is being categorized under public private partnerships.
Performance-based logistics (PBL) and similar mechanisms have become popular
for contracting the sustainment of military systems in the United States and Europe and aim
to replace traditional fixed-price and cost-plus contracts to improve product preparedness
and reduce the total cost of ownership of systems. PBL has become the US DoD’s
preferred support strategy for weapons systems (Gansler, 2000). These contracts specify
the government’s desired result without stipulating how a task should be performed, thus
granting contractors the flexibility to complete its tasks in the manner the firm deems
most appropriate PBL contracts are normally executed at three levels: component-level,
subsystem-level, and system or platform-level. Subsystem-level contracts are the most
prevalent form of PBL. In a subsystem PBL contract, the contractor is tasked with sustaining
a subsystem over a period of 5-10 years4 – often the subsystem has previously been
supported via a non-PBL contract. Many of today’s PBL contracts use what is referred
to as public-private partnerships (PPPs). In a subsystem PBL, a PPP could mean that
the contractor partners with government owned and staffed maintenance facility. The
contractor brings in their best practices and manages the facility, and the contractor is
responsible for the outcome.5
Several studies have investigated the effectiveness of PBLs on product reliability
4 United States government PBL contracts are limited to a maximum 5 years by law. (FAR 16.505, FAR
17.104, FAR 17.204, FAR 22.1002)
5 PPPs in the civil infrastructure area (e.g., highway construction and support) have a different structure
than those referred to in subsystem PBL. Civil infrastructure PPPs require the private sector to take responsi-
bility for designing, building, financing, operating and maintaining an asset, which is a much broader view
than today’s subsystem PBL PPPs in use in the U.S. Department of Defense.
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in aerospace and electronics industry (Hockley et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2007) as well as
quantitative survey analysis over different defense agencies (Randall et al., 2011). They
have attempted quantitatively to relate the effect of incentives under this contract with
reliability improvement under PBL against conventional contracts. The expectation is
that the incentives of contractors will drive their course of action in the design process
so we should be able to see either an increase in scheduled maintenance or increase of
reliability, either way an increase in availability. Under availability-based contracting,
manufacturers supposedly move their designs toward higher maintainability and reliability
products, which leads to higher availability for the customer. Pricing such activities and
progressive decision making throughout the life cycle is a stochastic optimization problem
that is being performed today using highly qualitative “fudge factors” (Thompson, 2010).
Some authors use game theory to model the interaction between customer and contractor
toward decisions to improve the reliability (Ashgarizadeh & Murthy, 2000). Sometimes
the customer is interested in layered availability, which means differentiating between
subsystems or the interconnection between systems and their interactions. In other cases,
the limitation on contractors comes from the fundamental physics and/or properties of the
materials and cannot be resolved. Some have argued that these contracts are not necessarily
designed to save money, but rather to maintain or improve the current system or platform
performance in a cost constrained world (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008).
Another significant challenge with PBL contracts is to determine the contract re-
quirements and price that protects the interest of the customer, i.e., which does not overpay
the contractor, but also minimizes that risk that the system will become unsupported. Sub-
system PBL contracts are generally priced based on: 1) estimating how many units will
need repair, 2) how much it will cost for each repair, and 3) how the number of units
requiring repair and/or the repair cost will decrease over time as a result of design and/or
maintenance improvements made by the contractor. If greater than projected improve-
ments are realized, the money saved is shared with the contractor according to a schedule
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negotiated in the contract (“gain share”). Meeting or exceeding target performance may
also allow the contractor to add additional years to the contract (“award term”). With
subsystem PBL contacts, it is reasonably straightforward for the customer (which is most
often the government) to demonstrate a benefit by determining what it would cost to sup-
port the system doing business as usual (no improvements, non-PBL contract) compared
to the cost of a PBL contract, e.g., often pre-PBL support and performance experience
exists. However, for new system acquisition, where there is no sustainment history; and
for platform-level PBL, the PBL contract pricing problem is much more complex and it is
unclear how to optimally apply PBL contract mechanisms. For example, a recent study of
PBL effectiveness (Boyce & Banghart, 2012), reported on the cost of 21 PBL contracts
where in 9 out of 9 component and subsystem-level PBL contracts the cost decreased, but
for platform-level (called system-level in the study), PBL 6 out of 12 contracts resulted in
either cost increases or indeterminable cost changes.
PBL and availability payment PPPs share many characteristics. In both cases, the
public and private sector objectives are aligned towards ensuring better value for the end
users/public. These contracts are long-term in nature and demand the private sector to
play a major role in meeting the objectives of the system or project. The private sector
bears the majority of project or system risks and is encouraged to pursue innovative
processes and methods. Table 1.2 summarizes the similarities and differences between
these contracts. Although the procurement contracts are operated by different public
agencies and targeted on different assets, they all must be well-designed and priced to
ensure adequate protection of the public interest. In the defense industry, the challenge
becomes much greater considering the complexity and uncertainty of defense acquisition
programs. While current practices may be effective at the component and subsystem levels,
pricing a PBL contract becomes more difficult for a new system acquisition where no prior
estimates of any kind are available. Therefore, developing and introducing innovative
methods and best practices in civil infrastructure PPPs have great potential to improve
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DoD PBL contract acquisition significantly.
Table 1.2: Mapping of Availability Payment Contracts to PBL Contracts








Incentive Contractor rewarded for
performance exceeding
expectations
Typically not used. In some
cases, incentives are used for
qualify materials up to 5% of
total construction cost.
Penalty Penalized for not meeting
performance criteria and
non-availability
Penalized for not meeting
performance criteria and
non-availability
Pricing Bidding Engineer estimate and bidding
Value for Money Benchmarking—compare to
non-PBL contracts; market
research
Value for money analysis to
consider unique characteristics
of infrastructure project
Contract Term Medium to long-term (5 year
base contract followed by a 5
year extension)-duration based
on regulations.
Long-term (minimum 10 year
and maximum 99 years),
duration based on the value for
money analysis
Renegotiation Allowed and possible May be allowed
1.6 The Design Process for Availability-Based Contracts
In the transition from conventional purchase models to a performance-based service con-
tract model, we need to re-examine the design process. Engineering system design and
pricing have a bi-directional relationship; one can reach the price from the design param-
eters or derive the design from a given budget. In the majority of engineering projects,
especially the ones dealing with designing new products, designers pursue the former
method; whereas in practice, and specifically in designing support and sustainment sys-
tems, the flow down of requirements will be determined by considering contractual terms
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and budgetary constraints. Breaking down the high-level requirements to lower-level
requirements requires considering constraints from lower levels (Kohani & Pecht, 2015).
This bi-directional relationship creates new constraints for the contractual oriented design
(Sun et al., 2009).
The classical design for procurement and support contracts are a trade-off between
the costs of providing high reliability (such that the system lasts longer than support contract
lengths or the warranty term) and the opportunity costs of the manufacturer or maintenance
parties (Frangopol & Maute, 2003).
In terms of life-cycle cost estimation, the design process is conventionally a point-to-
point mapping from the space of the design parameters to the space of structural responses
(e.g., total life-cycle cost, availability). In this mapping, each point in the space of the
design parameters defines a feasible or non-feasible design structure, and all feasible
designs guarantee that the predetermined (contractually obligated) outcome requirement is
met (Bakhshi & Sandborn, 2017). Most approaches of this kind require many iterations in
the design without any guarantee that the requirement is met (Jazouli & Sandborn, 2010).
Also, the problem of uncertainty and unavailable data is adding to this mapping challenge.
Möller et al. (2011) tackles this problem by using fuzzy processes to capture uncertainty
without depending on statistical data. To assess the robustness and agility of such designs
more computationally burdensome analysis is needed. Also, when numerous stochastic
factors are present the proposed strategy might not be flexible enough for operational
support. The uncertainty in achieving the final design specification might not be acceptable
in many cases. This will become even more challenging in the context of life-cycle
engineering and the support of critical systems with complex supply chains. Risk-based
design literature has addressed a similar problem by considering uncertainty propagation
through the process and risk allocation and management. In conclusion, the design for
availability based contracts has new dimensions that need to be treated separately and
specifically from conventional design.
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Chapter 2: Problem Construction and Objectives
The general problem of designing an availability-based contract that can provide a win-
win situation by minimizing the cost for the contractor and guaranteeing availability for
customer is very general and beyond the scope of this dissertation. This dissertation is
limited in terms of scope (the life-cycle stage of the systems under the availability-based
contracts) and the parameters that can be designed in the contract and cost structure it
targets. This dissertation is also looking a single contract between the contractor and
customer and ignores the effect of long series of contracts that can occur under relational
contracting (Erkoyuncu, 2011).
Based on Operation of the Defense Acquisition System Instruction (DoD Instruction
5000.02), there are multiple stages of the life cycle that contracts can be used in: 1) material
solution analysis, 2) technology development, 3) engineering and manufacturing develop-
ment, 4) production and deployment and 5) operations and support. In this dissertation, we
are focusing on operation and support stage of the life cycle with a focus on sustainment
and maintenance activities.
In this dissertation, the contract is defined as a set of requirements with a specific
payment structure for a certain level performance for a specific length of time between
a customer and a contractor (two parties). The availability-contract design problem is
defined as finding the optimum requirement parameters under which the minimum required
availability level can be achieved for the customer while respecting cost constraints. In
practice, the contract can be designed by the customer or by a third-party who works for
the customer under a separate contract.
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Figure 4: Mapping of the availability-based contract as a control loop
We define the contractual relationship within a control theory framework in which the
system and the contractor use a set point defined by customer in a closed-loop control system.
Control theory framework can address the dynamics of contractor and performance in time,
as well as the impact of monitoring performance on the payments. Figure 4 shows that
the contractor’s action will be an input to the supply-chain system including the inventory
of the sub-assemblies in which their availability is the main factor being monitored by
the contract. This outcome will be used to calculate the payment, which will influence
contractor behavior. The contract can regulate the behavior of contractor the same way a
reference point or set points works in a control system.
A general payment model defines the amount and scheduling of payments the cus-
tomer should pay the contractor based on the level of effort or outcome obtained from the
contractor’s effort. In an availability-based contract, the payments are tied to the achieved
availability (interval, operational or point) as the result of the sustainment and maintenance
activities of the contractor.
The contractor’s decision making model assumes that the contractor optimizes their
actions to minimize their costs. Using these two players (the contractor and the customer),
a two-level optimization can be used to find the contract features and contractor behavior
to meet the requirements. One of the important features of availability-based contracts is
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the time-window that the customer measures the availability over. This concept is called
“checkpointing” in some applications and it is the interval in which one measures the
interval availability (i.e., the assessment interval).
In some industrial contexts the goal of the contract designer is to optimize (maximize)
the availability. For example, the DoD (DoD Directive, 5000) requires program managers
(PMs) to “develop and implement performance-based product support strategies that opti-
mize total system availability while minimizing cost and logistics footprint. Sustainment
strategies shall include the best use of public and private sector capabilities through govern-
ment/industry partnering initiatives, in accordance with statutory requirements.” However,
because the customer cannot know the level of effort of the contract and the contractor
cannot be certain about the outcome of their decisions or the customer’s level of usage
within the time scope of the contract (e.g., asymmetrical information and incentives) it is
not a trivial task to enforce and monitor the best effort of the contractor with a contract
(Hooper, 2008). For example, when an insured party obtains financial coverage against
a bad event from an insurer, they are likely to be less careful in trying to avoid the bad
outcome against which they are insured.
Objective Statement
Determine the best outcome-based contract that achieves the availability required
by the customer and concurrently minimizes the cost and risk for the customer and
maximizes the revenue for the contractor.
The objective addressed in this dissertation can be expressed by the following opti-
mization problem. The contractor is trying to minimize their total cost while guaranteeing
a required level of availability over the contract period (assuming 𝑁𝑎 equal assessment
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􏿹 , 𝑘 = 1, …, 𝑁𝑎 (9)
where, 𝑦∗(.) is the optimum performance, e.g., availability, 𝑑 is the effective discount/interest
rate per period, 𝑇 is the contract length in periods and 𝑁𝑎 is the number of assessments
during the contract time (𝑇). Meanwhile, the customer tries to maximize their profit under
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This is constrained by the following financial, performance (availability) and functionality
requirements over the whole contract period at all assessment points (𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑁𝑎).
Financial Requirement:
deductions(𝑘) + costs(𝑘) < 𝜂payments(𝑘), 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑁𝑎, (11)
Where 𝜂 is the bankruptcy prohibition coefficient to ensure the bankruptcy avoidance for





𝑝{(𝑦(𝑘) > 𝑅1(𝑘))} > 𝑟2(𝑘), 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑁𝑎
(12)
where 𝑅1 is a point availability requirement as defined in Section 1.3.1 and 𝑅2 is chance-
constraint or probabilistic availability requirements (refer to Section 1.3.5).
We model the dynamic of the inventory using dynamic system formalism given by
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functionality constraints that are derived by dynamical system representation:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝑥(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑓(𝑥(𝑡), 𝑢(𝑡)) + 𝑤1(𝑡)
𝑦(𝑡) = ℎ(𝑥(𝑡), 𝑢(𝑡)) + 𝑤2(𝑡),
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇, (13)
in which 𝑥(𝑡) is the states of the system, 𝑦(𝑡) represents the performance measure, 𝑤1(𝑡)
and 𝑤2(𝑡) are models inputs. 𝑓(.) and 𝑔(.) are functions. It should be noted that we assume
the 𝑦(𝑡) is completely measurable by customer.
In order to solve the availability-contract design problem posed above, it is necessary
to develop a comprehensive and detailed model of information and material flow. The
suggested algorithms should provide flexible and robust supply and logistics policies for
use in an uncertain environment. The output of such a design activity must be in the
form of simple policies, and the performance evaluation should be easily assessed to
support the performance of the suggested algorithm or solution. The common parameters
in these models address inventory policy (e.g., threshold, lead time, etc.) of safety stock as
well as shared inventories and the structure of the supply-chain network. Optimizing the
supply-chain network and inventory in a joint scheme is much more beneficial than solving
the problems separately. A similar approach should be applied to bring all optimization
elements into one platform.
The design process of an availability-based contract will use contract terms, goals
and requirements as inputs that define the satisficing parameters for supply chain, inventory
management and design parameters of an engineering systemwith respect to physical-based
and budget-based constraints (Figure 5).
The fact that many of parameters might have unknown distributions also needs to be
addressed. For defining availability requirements based on the statistics of a fleet of systems,
it is not clear what form/distribution of availability is best to guarantee the effectiveness and
proper interpretation of the requirement. The role of different requirements distributions
is unexplored at this time. There have been many attempts to use algebraic notation to
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Figure 5: Design of availability-based contracts
formulate the requirement and contract-based relationship, e.g., (Benvenuti et al., 2008).
Approaches to solving this problem should be capable of addressing statistical
constraints like the dependence between different variables, there will be no need for
over-simplification of the problem; moreover, it should have the flexibility to update the
model parameters using Bayesian statistics in response to information added through the
life cycle. The difference between assuming fixed end of support contracts and contracts
with an uncertain end of support is significant and has been the topic of much of the actuary
and medical health-care literature. However, in the maintenance scheduling literature, e.g.,
(Kim & Park, 2008), end of support is assumed to be fixed despite the common practice of
system life extension. The trade-off between cost and availability will be controllable at
each point of the life cycle as it is expected to be more expensive to maintain a high level
of availability as the system ages. Imperfect maintenance is another inevitable factor that
increases cost and uncertainty through the contract term.
2.1 Solution Requirements
Any solution provided should be able to address requirements break-down to lower-levels
or sub-contractors. The break down will be used by sub-system designers and they need
to benefit from the freedom provided by availability-based contracts otherwise the whole
purpose of contract optimization is irrelevant. Solutions are also required to provide a
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concise policy for defining logistics policies directly from the availability-based contract
requirements. The solution must also be capable of being broken down into contract
terms for sub-contractors in terms of bonuses, rewards and penalties. At some point, the
degrees of freedom embedded in the availability-based contract will be decomposed and
designing a contract should define the best way to do this. Any solution for designing such
a contract should consider the uncertainty in the level of incentives for the contractors; and
the progressive information gathering that is being done by both customer and contractor.
2.2 Research Tasks
The following tasks have been performed in this dissertation:
1. Gap analysis of availability-based contract design
Extensive litterateur review was done on publication spaces relevant to performance-based
logistics and availability-based contracting (details in Appendix B). The requirement and
gap analysis was done based on contract theory, defense acquisition and maintenance cost
modeling literatures. Then the key findings of this step was used in reviewing modeling,
simulation and optimization of reliability and supply chain systems to develop a frame-
work that defines requirements for future solutions as well as elements of the proposed
methodology in this dissertation.
2. Model development
Modeling the maintenance process of the system along with the inventory is the base of any
further analysis and exploration. The availability and optimal decision making of contractor
are taken as key factors of the overall model. A hybrid model that accommodates both
the discrete (inventory operation, performance assessment) and continuous (degradation,
reliability) nature of the problem has been developed. A discrete-event model captures
the maintenance events and reliability features of the underlying system. However, the
availability measurement along with the mathematical methods to guarantee optimality of
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the method are defined in the continuous space.
The importance of time interval of assessment identified in this stage as well as
inter-dependencies in sub-assemblies’ failure rate that will cause the number of failures to
not be independent in time and therefore a special attention was paid to address this aspect
in further steps.
3. Performance measurement design
The goal of availability contracts is to guarantee a specified level of preparedness within a
cost constraint. How a contractor is rewarded or penalized is highly dependent on these
performance measures. Thus defining the availability requirements is a very important
decision customer needs to make. The measurement of these metrics can also be a subject
of challenge, due to uncertainties and limited access to measure key performance factors.
Moreover, the relationship between these performance metrics and contractor cost model
in availability-based contracts is not trivial. Thus, the variety of availability related metrics
from variety of real-world contracts collected, classified and compared.
4. Contractor action modeling with an affine controller and convex optimization
The behavior and decision making of contractors modelled within a dynamic programing
aimed at cost optimization. An affine controller that represents usage of historical data to
make a new decision was used to represent this decision-making. The affine controller
also allows the use of a convex optimization scheme and guarantees global optimality in
this level.
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5. Developing the payment model
A payment model that simulates how different payment structures can be related to the
different performance measurement and structure has been developed based on Availability
Payments in Public Private Partnership.
6. Optimization of assessment time window for dynamical performance measures
This dissertation proposes the concept of an optimal time-assessment window for which
meeting the minimum requirements of a dynamic performance metric will translate into the
cost effective and optimum preparedness of the overall project. To find the time-assessment
window size, a Monte Carlo analysis was performed on the system and contractor model,
and a trade-off analysis of cost and risk is presented to find the optimum time window size.
7. Analysis of the role of uncertainty
The uncertainty of failure rate is different in different systems based on their age or usage
rate. Moreover, the impact of uncertainties on contractor’s pro-active/dynamic decision
making throughout the contract time should be considered. To consider these risks from the
viewpoint of customer throughout the contract mean-var analysis used in a multi-objective
decision making to isolate contracts with lowest cost and cost-risk.
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Chapter 3: QuantitativeMethods for theDesign ofAvailability-Based
Contracts: A Review of Methods and Gaps
3.1 Designing Availability-Based Contracts
The relevant literature was classified into several specific groups and the following inclusion
and exclusion criteria were used: economic models, operational research models, life-cycle
cost models, reliability and maintenance oriented design models, supply chain and logistics
surveys and reports. Based on the approach described in the Appendix, the literature is
classified. We define contract design as the process of defining requirements and finding
the optimum incentives and penalties to impose within the contract. This can include the
design of metrics and methods for measuring the desired performance of the contract.
Traditionally, a contract’s price and requirements are derived from a life-cycle cost
estimation(Bakhshi et al., 2015). Most of these estimations are based on the historical data
associated with similar projects in the past, assigning cost to each unit of simulation (Datta
& Roy, 2010). Using a variety of information from the past (i.e., reliability, cost, lead-time,
delay, etc.), contractors choose the best or optimum parameters for their operation. In
this paper, we call parameters pertaining to the sustainment of a system design policy
parameters. Some of these requirements may be redefined as the project progresses
(Defense Acquisition University Press, 2005). The design policy parameters change
throughout the life cycle. To find the optimum parameter space for sustainment design to
meet the requirements, many simulations over the life cycle of the system are required.
Each unique design parameter value requires a model to be assigned to feasible points in
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the outcome space (reachability analysis).
In this chapter, we subdivide availability-contract design into its principal elements
so that the goals of each portion of the design can be clarified. The following subsections
discuss the key elements of this problem.
3.1.1 Reliability Modeling and Condition Monitoring
One of the goals of performance-based contracts is to encourage manufacturers and main-
tenance (O&M) contractors to improve reliability, aside from focusing on replacement and
supply-chain logistics alone. Evidence-based studies have investigated the effectiveness
of PBLs on product reliability in the aerospace and electronics industry (Guajardo et al.,
2012).
From the view point of the contractor, significant research has been performed on
optimizing reliability in the product design stage toward a limited (e.g., for warranty
contracts) or unlimited time horizon (Frangopol & Maute, 2003). There is also significant
work on multi-objective optimization of reliability and cost along with other performance
objectives (Juang et al., 2008; Lapa et al., 2006; Volovoi, 2004b).
From the view point of both the contractor and the customer, maintenance models
predict the life-cycle cost associated with different sustainment policies and can optimize
the efforts required to maintain a specific level of workload. Bowman and Schmee (2001)
outlined the architecture of a simulation tool for pricing maintenance contracts for a fleet
of systems using historical data. In the absence of historical data, there are also methods
proposed that do not require quantitative records. These methods are well suited to the type
of uncertainties in design for long-term development projects as mentioned in (Zietlow,
2007), as well as new product design.
Condition monitoring has been a typical practice for improving availability and re-
ducing maintenance cost. Nilsson and Bertling (2007) have demonstrated the effectiveness
of condition monitoring systems in maintenance management of offshore wind farms.
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Prognostics and health management (PHM) also can help contractors to meet their avail-
ability requirements as demonstrated in (Feldman et al., 2009) and (Lei & Sandborn, 2017).
Garza et al. (2008) have introduced the importance of performance sampling procedures for
monitoring the contractor’s performance under a performance-based maintenance contract
specifically from the customer’s point of view. Complexities related to contracts that
address heterogeneous fleet availability is another venue of research that has been widely
ignored. Block et al. (2014) developed a parametric method to measure the fleet-availability
of repairable units.
Another factor in contract-oriented design identified in the reliability literature is the
stage of life of the platform and the contract time-span. The requirements and conditions
for a newly acquired platform are different from the requirements at the end-of-support
or at the phase-out stage. Dandotiya et al. (2008) study optimal maintenance decision
making for a fleet of airplanes with a variety of ages. Block et al. (2010) optimize the repair
scheduling during phase-out of an aircraft fleet by considering the platform end-of-life
characteristics.
Human factor reliability and organizational dynamics are also of great importance
in the environment of contract-based design. Mendoza and Devlin (2005) demonstrate
the importance of organizational design, in maintaining the desired performance in the
environment of contract-based design. We will address these factors in the context of the
role of incentives in decision-making, in the next section.
3.1.2 Role of Incentives and Contract Theory
Contract theory is a well-developed and well-reviewed subject in the fields of law and
economics. In the context of service and maintenance contracts, models incorporate
incentives (e.g., payments, penalties, rewards) and uncertainties (outcomes of actions,
risk taking behavior), and try to identify decisions that lead to optimum outcomes, given
asymmetric information on each party in a contract. For example, Jin et al. (2015) used a
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principal-agent model to model the contract along with jointly optimizing the maintenance,
the spares inventory, and the repair capacity under the game-theoretical framework. They
concluded that longer service contracts are preferred by suppliers because they allow the
supplier to save on the annualized inventory investment.
The contract terms and requirements can greatly impact the contractor’s decisions and
potentially reduce the system life-cycle cost and improve the system reliability. (Guajardo
et al., 2012) used an evidence-based method to demonstrate the effectiveness of incentives
in performance-based contracting on product reliability. Hawker and McMillan (2015)
explored the impact of maintenance contract incentives on the energy production of wind
farms.
The effects of a contractor’s decisions on the life-cycle cost and availability will not
be fully known to the customer at the time of acquisition, or even by the end of the contract
time period. This effect is generally categorized as a “moral hazard” problem.1 In an effort
to review the limits of effectiveness of performance-based contracting, (Kobren, 2009)
noted that this class of contract does not simply shift all the risk to contractors, but also
it can add risks (of non-completion/fulfillment and other risks) to the customer side. For
example, contractors may choose not to bid for contracts especially in high-risk research
and development projects.
The operational research literature contains many papers considering different ab-
stract models and cases in different industries where the government is the sole customer
(e.g., healthcare and defense) (Tsay, 1999; Hockley et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2007). Con-
tractors can be classified into two different categories based on how they respond to the
risk and incentives: risk-taker and risk-averse. In the context of sustainment contracts,
numerous works acknowledge the efficiency of performance-based design concepts without
addressing the interaction between contractor and sub-contractors, or considering physical
limitations of the system (Scherer, 1964). The development in this field considers a variety
1 “Moral hazard” means that the party that takes the risk will not be responsible for the possible costs and
the other party may or may not have information about it.
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of contractual mechanism, contractors and customer configurations. For example (Zhu
& Fung, 2012) propose modular designs for the interaction between fourth-party and
third-party logistics providers in performance-based logistics contracts.
The role of incentives has also been studied in the game theory applications literature.
(Ashgarizadeh&Murthy, 2000) introduced amodel for the interaction between the customer
and the contractor in service contracts. Without considering the effect of incentives on
designer decision making, one might not realize the effect of different contract design
parameters specially the effect of penalties and awards on the contractor.
In summary, there are many works that use abstract contract models that capture a
variety of contractual configurations but there has been no effort to quantitatively integrate
the economic and engineering models to demonstrate the impact of these contracts on the
designers, the customer and the sustainment process.
3.1.3 Supply-Chain Management
Supply-chain management is one of the application spaces that performance-based contracts
are impacting most significantly. Contracting in the supply-chain space in an effort to
promote efficiency has been studied extensively; however, theoretical work in this field has
not found its way into practice (Lafontaine & Slade, 2002). In a meticulous and extensive
review of quantitative supply-chain contract design, Tsay (1999) provides a literature
review of supply contracts from a modeling perspective and finds that it is not clear what
constitutes a contract in the supply-chain contract literature. Most of the works in this
space define performance-based logistics as an efficient supply chain with the flexibility
to mitigate disruptions and to evolve as necessary (Glas et al., 2013). Elements of the
desired solution are being addressed with high-level information management architecture,
intelligent hardware allocation/distribution and extensive data collection and monitoring.
There are qualitative works and surveys that address risk management and modeling
of PBL applications (Arora et al., 2010); however, there are few works that address a
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theoretical grounding or provide empirical studies of this class of contract. In most cases,
the life cycle of contracts in these works are short and do not represent the situation of
long-term sustainment contracts. The long-term aspect of performance-based contracting
is so significant that long-term relationships between the contractor and customers have
also been studied as a form of networks of relationships rather than a market of buyers and
sellers (Jin & Wu, 2002).
Among numerous works that consider sharing the benefits of efficiency, (Cachon &
Lariviere, 2005) show that when forecasts are not credible enough, supply-chain perfor-
mance falls short of what is expected. Modeling and prediction for variation in demand is
a key feature that is the focus of the inventory optimization research. To address uncertain-
ties in long-term contracts, simulation is proposed to account for the stochastic nature of
demand and other uncertainties in the environment, such as change of regulations (Komoto
et al., 2011). For a concise review of modeling supply-chain contracts see (Tsay, 1999).
3.1.4 Integrated Design and Joint Optimization
For an enterprise-level performance measure like availability, an integrated end-to-end
model that includes maintenance, logistics, supply chain and financial cash flow is needed.
The benefits of such models have been addressed in recent literature (Godoy et al., 2014;
Grossmann, 2012). In designing availability-based contracts, optimizing inventory, supply
chain, maintenance, and system design parameters in an integrated scheme gives the de-
signer a degree of freedom that allows true utilization of performance-based contracting.
Studying jointly optimal subsystems or integrating different optimization schemes is dif-
ferent from serialization of a set of problems. Similarly, the design for the post-production
purchase period is more than just designing a new product and then optimizing the service
separately (Baines et al., 2009; Johnstone et al., 2008). The product-service-systems (PSS)
literature deals with dynamic interdependencies of product and service in an integrated
scheme. The solution needs to be an effective combination of technical and economic
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approaches. The first step is to combine the inventory, maintenance, and operational deci-
sions together and form a unified model that provides visibility into the effect of different
parameters (Arora et al., 2010; Rodriguez & Vecchietti, 2010). Therefore, the importance
of careful integration of logistics, maintenance and supply chain in the design phase is
essential.
3.1.5 Performance Management and Analysis
The effectiveness of performance-based contracts has been debated (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2008). Surveys of performance-based contracts show that customers
and contractors face serious challenges in defining the terms and conditions of the con-
tract, including the contract’s scope, responsibilities, the metrics to be measured, how to
measure them, and the translation of measurement to rewards (Gupta et al., 2011). There
is uncertainty in what performance analysis metrics need to be addressed. Possible metrics
include the time window of the performance assessment, the size of the fleet that is on
demand, and metrics to monitor and the weight of each parameter in building an overall
availability measure.
It is clear that conventional life-cycle cost methods are failing to address multi-
disciplinary product-service-systems (Settanni et al., 2017). Moreover, in the case of
availability-based contracts from the customer’s view point, availability is a measurable
index for the effectiveness of the service provided by the system. From the designer’s view
point, availability, along with technical performance, cost, and process efficiency are the
final goals (outputs) of the logistic and engineering design process. The asymmetry of
available information affects the decisions of contractors, while the customer might not
be able to evaluate the decision without having a reverse-looking (i.e., historical) model
(Datta & Roy, 2010).
Overall performance evaluation will come from the performance assessment of
sub-systems. Relating the performance of different subsystems to the performance of the
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overall system is also a critical and non-trivial task (Sherbrooke, 1971). One of the reasons
that availability and reliability are factors of interest is due to the potential for calculating
these performance metrics at a system level solely based on sub-system level performances.
The challenge of evaluating inventory management performance is as old as inventory
modeling and optimization (Feeney & Sherbrooke, 1966; Sherbrooke, 2006). The time
intervals over which performance is measured needs to be chosen very carefully (Ferreira
et al., 2009). Cost modeling of availability type contracts will be strongly tied to these
performance metrics rather than activities and material flow (Datta & Roy, 2010; Lai et al.,
2002).
Performance analysis and metrics of evaluation are the most important factors on the
customer side. If requirements are inaccurately defined, performance-based contracts can-
not provide the desired outcomes, and both parties will suffer the consequences. Defining
performance metrics and evaluating them is embedded in the definition of the requirements
and can be viewed as a legal document in the event of disagreements (Goebel et al., 2000).
3.2 Analytics of Methods
Although the pricing of availability-based contracts has been mentioned in a few reports,
e.g., (Whitehead & Jagdale, 2008), these reports provide no details clarifying their approach
to capturing the complexities and differences of such contracts compared to conventional
contracts. As of now, pricing performance-based contracts is largely absent from the
academic literature. In this section, we focus on existing methods of modeling applicable
to the availability-based contract design problem (these are summarized in the Appendix).
More detailed descriptions of these methods can be found in the associated references;
thus, only brief overviews are provided here. The bottlenecks associated with using each
of these approaches in availability-based contract design are clarified, and the challenges
faced by all of these methodologies are summarized in the discussion that follows.
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3.2.1 Optimization
The goal of an availability-based contract is to guarantee a specific availability level at all
times when the operation of the system is required. This can be achieved by maximizing
the availability, however, meeting a minimum availability requirement can also satisfy
this goal — the costs and risks associated with these two approaches can be very different.
Availability requirements are usually used as a constraint within an optimization problem
(Alfredsson, 1997; Dekker, 1996; Hokstad et al., 2005; Immonen & Niemelä, 2008), where
the decision parameters can be reliability, preventive maintenance scheduling, system
configuration, or supply-chain costs. In most of the existing optimization works, availability
is not actually the objective or the control variable. Although many authors address
availability, they are indirectly treating it via other parameters related to reliability and
maintainability: reliability (McCall, 1965), maintainability (Canfield, 1986) and the spare
part supply chain, including: inventory (Alfredsson, 1997), logistics and administrative,
etc. (Labadi et al., 2007). Most of the work in this group does not address the contractual
requirements over the total operational time.
Trade-off analysis is an essential part of designing such contracts; more maintenance
actions will potentially increase reliability at the expense of more downtime. For example,
the effect of different inventory policies on the short term and long term costs are different.
There are multi-objective schemes that focus on concurrently reducing the costs associated
with supporting the system and increasing availability (Taboada et al., 2008).
Overall, high-availability systems have interested researchers from the fields of
operational research, management science, computer networks, and reliability engineering
(Immonen &Niemelä, 2008; Janakiraman et al., 2004; Sherif & Smith, 2006). The majority
of the existing studies represent the availability using analytical expressions (Albright &
Soni, 1988; Dekker & Scarf, 1998). There is another group of approaches that look at
availability as a state for the whole system (Sato & Trivedi, 2007). This simplification
allows the utilization of elegant methods to prove optimality; examples include inventory
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optimization using s-S policy (Feeney & Sherbrooke, 1966; Wei et al., 2011).
The existing work proves the feasibility of availability optimization for simplified
types of systems; however, when availability needs to be evaluated for large populations
of complex systems over the total support time, no single method suffices. At this point,
there are a only few examples of existing works associated with maximizing a cost-benefit
function that combines the accumulated life-cycle costs associated with a specific system’s
management (e.g., logistics, maintenance, reliability, etc.) and the availability achieved
(Canfield, 1986; Kajal et al., 2013).
3.2.2 System Dynamics
System dynamics models look at the relationship between different factors, for example
efficiency, cost and higher-level factors; and drive the dynamics of results by simulating
ordinary differential equations between these factors (Angerhofer & Angelides, 2000).
Such a meta-level point of view can model the dynamics of the system as well as expert
knowledge about the important factors of the model to the study overall performance of
the contractor or the system under contract. Classic dynamics of the system addresses
system performance over time. For example, degradation of components, evolution of
symptoms related to deterioration mechanisms, and the effect of information sharing on
maintenance quality, and generally the relation between different causes of performance
change. System dynamics uses a network of differential equations and forms decision
modeling approaches that are widely used in logistics and supply chain analysis applications
(Hussain et al., 2012) as well as in modeling different aspects of public-private partnerships
(Angerhofer & Angelides, 2000). In the project management literature, system dynamics
is an appropriate tool for modeling the relationship between different decision variables
and essential outcomes of interest for the contractor and customers.
System dynamics is generally used in a top-down fashion to simplify the relationships
between different elements within a system and time-varying or non-linear parameters, i.e.,
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system dynamics solutions usually don’t have a view of individual system components.
The source of equations that define parameters comes from experts, surveys, and historical
data, and may be inaccurate for new projects that lack historical precedent/data. As such,
this approach is also not generally flexible for analysis of what-if-cases.
3.2.3 Markov Chains
Markov chains have been extensively used to analyze different aspects of reliability, depend-
ability, risk analysis and in general probabilistic modeling for operation and management.
Markov models are the standard framework for prediction of steady-state performance
(Caro et al., 2010). They are rooted in modeling different states of operation (e.g., failures,
and repair) and ignore the statistical dependency that exists in each component’s failure
data and its specific maintenance history. Neuman and Bonhomme (1974) address the
maintenance policies under which Markov chain models can provide an accurate estimate
of reality. Using Markovian methods to model inventory management is well developed in
the literature (Albright & Soni, 1988). Markov models and decision trees in general lack
the flexibility required for modeling the reality of maintenance and reliability management.
Markov chain modeling forces the models states that are continuous as discrete. Examples
of such states include maintenance quality, severity of a failure, etc. More discrete states
have to be used if one decides to model such states in more detail. At the same time, the
uncertainty cannot be well defined, as each component of a system can only be in one state
at a time, since each state must be exclusive from other states. Additionally, due to their
state-based structure, Markov chains do not provide a clear prediction of the next event
time given the time the component has been in a neighbor state (Simpson et al., 2009).
In Markov chain based studies in the reliability and maintenance literature, there is
minimal attention paid to the variability and the stochastic nature of each parameter (or lack
of knowledge of the distributional properties of parameters) and changes in uncertainty as
time progresses. To address this gap, Bayesian extensions of Markov decision processes
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suitable for including epistemic uncertainty are introduced as in (Memarzadeh et al., 2014)
Markov decision processes in general do not allow the model to properly include the
knowledge available about the system, which may result in non-optimal strategies. Markov
chains also will not provide a full picture of system behavior under certain strategies. Also
flexibility of decision making and decision parameters during the contract term, in the
performance-based contracts, is mostly neglected by Markov chain approaches.
3.2.4 Event-Based Simulations
All the approaches mentioned so far assume that the dynamics of the system are known,
(e.g., in a closed-form) and they analyze the fleet of systems as a whole. The system can also
be modeled using scenario-based methods that simulate each item of the system separately
through different event-paths/sample paths (Fu, 1994). Simulation-based methods consider
components with differing attributes that move from one event to another in time while
including modeling parameters of each component, such as age, maintenance history,
and usage profile. Many recent analyses use simulation for optimization of different
aspects of maintenance scheduling (Wijk et al., 2011). Simulation-based approaches are
especially useful and common when the model grows in size or the integration of multiple
disciplines is required e.g. (Keskin et al., 2010). Monte Carlo sampling is usually used
for sampling from probability distributions of each parameter, as long as one can estimate
reasonable distributions (Marseguerra & Zio, 2000). Karnon (2003) compares discrete-
event simulation and a Markovian process for assessing the effectiveness of health care
policies; due to the importance of each instance of the system, discrete-event simulators
were preferred. Discrete-event simulation tends to offer better representational support for
organizational decision-making processes (Bodner et al., 2009).
Discrete-event simulation (DES) tests different scenarios, along with various behav-
iors of contractors (Angerhofer & Angelides, 2000). Bowman and Schmee (2001) offer a
discrete-event simulation model utilizing historical data of cost and failure analysis results
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to evaluate contract price. Ferguson and Sodhi (2011) addresses the role of simulation
in performance-based contract design by looking at the PBL contract as a news-vendor
optimization problem and advises on the best inventory policies.
Petri nets are a formal discrete-event simulation approach developed for capturing
concurrency and synchronization properties. Formal models like Petri models are however
more constrained during model development but have a number of advantages over simply
writing simulation codes or discrete-event simulators (Volovoi, 2004b). Petri nets can be
used to develop models that can easily be verified for deadlocks, conflict of conditions,
catastrophic states, and logical errors. Formal methods offer an articulated representation
of a system based on mathematical formalism, in which mathematics helps to prove
consistency of the specification and requirements while addressing the reliability parameters
such as aging of components (Volovoi, 2004a). Petri nets are also used to model multi-
party contracts to look for accordance (agreement with no conflict) of the public and
private view of contractors, e.g., Aalst et al. (2010), that will guarantee the correct overall
implementation of the contract. Meta-heuristic optimizations like genetic algorithms and
particle swarm optimization can also be used in combination of a discrete-event simulation
as well as being included in the simulation-based category (Kajal et al., 2013).
Lastly, when it comes to cost modeling, event-based simulation is the powerful and
flexible cost modeling method. . As Cai and Tyagi (2014) note, most cost models use a
combination of historical data or parametric models that are only valid for the conditions
under which the data was collected. However, for novel problems such as multi-generation
products with complex design phases a new simulation based paradigm is needed. Due
to the novelty of performance-based contracts and their impact on performance data, the
capabilities of simulation-based methods are needed(Bakhshi & Sandborn, 2017).
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3.3 State-of-the-Art in Contract-Based System Design
Traditionally, the contract and product parameters are defined separately. In recent years,
driven by a need for enhancing system reliability, maintainability, and logistics support,
attempts to include contract and engineering (performance) parameters simultaneously have
been articulated, but have not been done. There are a significant number of papers with a
wide array of measures to determine performance, taking both objective and subjective
views.
In this Section, the relevant approaches for designing contracts and products are
reviewed and the need for a concurrent contract-engineering design is introduced as a key
solution to obtain a more realistic overall PSS design.
The correlation between contracts and the PSS design process can be classified into
three categories:
1. Engineering/logistics design using fixed contract parameters
In this category, it is assumed that the contract parameters are given as a set of requirements,
and they are treated as fixed input parameters in the PSS design (i.e., they are constraints
on the PSS design). Hence, the PSS parameters are designed to maximize the operating
performance and functionality that satisfies the contract requirements.
Examples of product design processes (hardware and/or software) that include one
or more contract parameters, e.g., cost constraints, length of support requirements, etc.,
are very common. The analysis in (Lei & Sandborn, 2017) is an example of this category
of work where PPA requirements (energy price and the annual delivery target are used
to perform maintenance planning design for the wind farm). Other examples include
(Nowicki et al., 2008) who developed a spare previsioning system to respond to a given
performance-based contract from the viewpoint of the contractor. In (Nowicki et al., 2008)
the contractor’s objective is to maximize profit and the scope of its activity by optimizing
the inventory level (the inventory level is considered to be part of the logistics design).
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This scheme also includes sensitivity analysis that addresses the reliability of the product.
Less common are PSS design processes that use actual availability requirements.
(Jazouli et al., 2014) estimated the required logistics, design, and operation parameters
for a specific availability requirement. In this work the developed model connects the
requirements on each operational decision regarding repair, replacement and inventory
lead-time so that the impact of contract terms can be seen on the logistics decisions. Jin
and Wang (2011) studied the impact of reliability and usage uncertainty on planning PBCs
incorporating equipment availability, mean-time-to-failure, and mean-time-to-repair.
2. Contract design that uses fixed product parameters
In this category, the contract parameters are optimized for a given PSS. For example, the
following contract parameters may be determined: the payment schedules (amount and
timing) (Sharma et al., 2010), profit sharing (Hamidi et al., 2014), the length of contract
(Deng et al., 2015), the selected contract mechanism (Hong et al., 2016; Nowicki et al.,
2008), supply-chain parameters (inventory lead time,2 back-order penalties, etc.) (Zhu &
Fung, 2012), and warranty3 design could be determined (Arora et al., 2010).
Examples of work in this category include Arora et al. (2010) who studied an inte-
grated inventory and logistics model to minimize the cost of the total cost of supply-chain
support (Nowicki et al., 2008) developed a model that designs performance-based contracts
with different lengths and contract fees. In this work the contract design is based on a given
product with a fixed initial reliability. They explore the opportunity for further investment
in improvements in the product’s reliability under the proposed PBC to demonstrate a
win-win for the customer and contractor through the optimal choice of contact length.
2The inventory lead time (ILT) was considered to be a logistics parameter determined from an availability
requirement. It is also possible that ILT is a contract parameter that is flowed down to sub-contractors.
3Although we include warranty design in the list of possible contract design activities that could be
driven by the product parameters, for most products that have warranties the type of warranty and its length
are determined by marketing, and are not based on the product’s predicted reliability. More commonly,
the warranty type and length (which are a contract) are passed to the engineering design to determine the
appropriate warranty reserve fund.
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Hong et al. (2016) employed mechanism design theory4 to design an optimized main-
tenance service contract for gas turbines in which uncertainties associated with customer
actions, engine performance, and maintenance costs during the contract execution phase
were accounted for. They assumed that the gas turbine design was given and determined
the contract that maximizes the expected profit and provides a win-win incentive for the
customer and contractor.
Wang (2010) developed and discussed three different contract options for mainte-
nance service contracts between a customer and a contractor for a given system design.
The contract options were: 1) a full contract that covers both inspections and inspection
repairs, and failure repairs, 2) a partial contract that covers inspections and inspection
repairs, but not the failure repairs, and 3) a partial contract that covers failure repairs only.
For this category, there are several challenges. The existing models require a better
understanding of the impact of incentive structures on the system design and usage. Zhu
and Fung (2012) proposed a model based on the service delivery and customer satisfaction
level. They studied the design of optimal contracts that balances the incentives and risks to
the two sides of a contract, so that both can achieve maximum profits. They assume that
incentive payments to the contractor are dependent on the contractor’s performance. Further
research is also required on the risk attitude of contractors: risk-aggressive, risk-averse, or
prudent. In addition, a more general and comprehensive model would include flexibility for
the service provider to change their level of effort during the project to increase the chances
of meeting their contractual goals. Moreover, an important gap in contract theory models
is the assumption of a static risk allocation for the entire length of a project.5 Zhao and Yin
(2011) propose a theoretical model for a dynamic risk allocation in constructing a project.
However, a successful dynamic risk allocation needs a comprehensive understanding of
both engineering and contractual parameters and their variations throughout a project. Such
4Mechanism design theory is an economic theory that seeks to determine when a particular strategy or
contract mechanism will work efficiently.
5 This problem is also reflected in choosing a single value for the cost of money, i.e., the cost of money is
not constant over time (nor the same for all projects within an organization).
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a dynamic risk allocation is not addressed in any theoretical models and is the subject of
the next category.
3. Concurrent design of the contract and the PSS
Finally, the concurrent design of both the contract and the PSS would be the ideal solu-
tion (for both the customer and contractor) for real applications. However, there are no
models that accurately assess and design CfA, dealing with all the risks and uncertainties
involved (Rodrigues et al., 2015). One important proposed solution to fill this gap is to use
engineering inputs and to find the engineering connections to current theoretical contract
models (Hockley et al., 2011). Kashani-Pour et al. (2016) and Alrabghi and Tiwari (2015)
reviewed a wide-range existing analytical models in this space and developed a framework
for the design of availability-based contracts with consideration of engineering design and
incentive structure.
There is an increasing interest in employing PBC concepts to obtain a better mutual
understanding between the supplier and the customer. However, the existing literature
is primarily focused on solving the problem from the contractor point of view and does
not address the role of optimum contract design from the customer’s viewpoint. This is
partially due to the relatively short history of this class of contract (Rodrigues et al., 2015),
a lack of sufficient public data on different design contracts, and ignorance of the dynamic
impact of uncertainties in the existing models.
A few authors discuss the need for concurrent design, e.g., (Nowicki et al., 2008)
even fewer attempt to provide any type of solution to the problem (Hong et al., 2016), and
in cases that claim to address both the customer and contractor, the solutions are primarily
sensitivity analyses that ignore the asymmetry of information or moral hazard problem.6
Another proposed approach (also sensitivity analysis) is to study the impact of engineering
parameters on the construction of contracts (Erkoyuncu et al., 2009). Sols et al. (2008)
6 While there are some major manufacturers who appear to (or claim to) use an integrated approach in
designing a concurrent contract and product parameters, they are unpublished and no details are available.
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studied the formulation of an n-dimensional performance-based reward model for use in
PBC contracts. They developed an n-dimensional metrics structure that represents the
system effectiveness along with its reward model that results in a successful PBC contract.
The type of cost modeling necessary for concurrent engineering and contract design
isn’t the same as for either engineering or contract design alone. Most of the current
CfA decisions are based on expert opinions, estimation, and historical data from previous
designs, which can be unreliable (Knight & Singer, 2014). In addition, such an approach is
less useful when system complexity increases (Ferguson & Sodhi, 2011). Also, a lack of
relevant historical data is a major source of challenge in new projects (Knight & Singer,
2014; Ferguson & Sodhi, 2011).
Based on Kashani-Pour et al. (2016), solutions provided in this category should
be able to address the requirements breakdown (or flow down) to sub-contractors. The
breakdown of requirements for use by sub-system designers shares the freedom provided
by availability-based contracts. Solutions are also required to provide concise algorithms so
that the availability will be tangible and measureable, and so the contractor can implement
and understand the requirements within their sustainment activities. Designing availability-
based contracts should address reliability design of products and operational decisions
based on condition monitoring technologies, the role of incentives and their impact on the
life-cycle of the product, supply chain management of the PSS, and the integrated design
and joint optimization of different performance metrics. These requirements make the use
of concurrent design of PSS and contracts a necessary approach to model the problem for
application in real-world practice.
The key questions that should be answered in this category are: 1) What are the main
elements of an availability-based contract for a PSS? 2) What are the essential attributes
of the concurrent PSS and contract design process? And 3) How are the advantages of
concurrent design of PSS and contracts versus the first two category of design verified?
To summarize the concurrent design of contract and PSS needs to address both the
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contractor and customer and the dynamics created by the contractual term between them
including addressing uncertainties in achieving availability or reliability-related challenges.
Concurrent design considers contract design as a part of integrated system design with
PSS and the contract of main sub-systems with a dynamic relationship that is subject to
stochastic processes such as reliability, supply-chain demand and operational uncertainties.
3.4 Contract Design as a System Design Problem
We approach contract design as a system design problem where the process of designing
contractual terms that address performance metrics, the payment model, and performance
assessment are design parameters and a multidisciplinary life-cycle simulation of design
impacts needs to be integrated into the engineering design process. The significant challenge
of contract design in practice is on the customer side.
In the case of availability-based contracts, the TES and engineering designs should
determine the contract requirements and the contract length and price in the acquisition
and procurement stage, so that it protects the interests of the customer throughout the life
cycle (i.e., it does not overpay the contractor, but also minimizes the risk that the system
will become unsupported). Also, the solutions provided should be able to address the
requirements breakdown (or flow down) to sub-contractors. The breakdown of require-
ments for use by sub-system designers shares the freedom provided by availability-based
contracts. Solutions are also required to provide concise algorithms so that the availability
will be tangible and measureable. Hence, the contractor can implement and understand the
requirements within their sustainment activities and product life-cycle management.
3.5 Gaps
In order to solve the availability-contract design problem, it is necessary to develop a
comprehensive and detailed model that addresses interdependencies, uncertainties as well
as the role of contractor incentives. The output of the design activity must be in the form
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of straightforward requirements. Figure 6 shows the envisioned design process. The
design process iterates, mapping from inputs: contract terms, goals and requirements, to
the outputs: satisficing parameters of an engineered system. It starts with the customer
deciding on the mechanism of the contract and the best contract-design parameters (e.g.,
incentive model, contract length, performance objective function). Then the customer
needs to model the contractor’s maintenance, reliability and supply chain decision making
with respect to optimizing the contractor’s objective function. This model must consider
the uncertainty in the usage and historical data. Since contractor optimization does not
address the life cycle of the system outside of the contract, the cost and availability of the
system resulting from their decisions needs to be also assessed for its long-term impact
on the life-cycle cost of the system. The result will be used by customer to adjust the
contractual parameters (during system design iterations) in order to achieve their long-term
goals for the system. The constraints on the optimization in each step in the process of
designing the contract include both physical-based (technology, geometry, materials, etc.)
and budget-based.
The significant challenge of contract design in practice is on the customer side. In the
case of availability-based contracts, the design should determine the contract requirements,
length and price in the acquisition and procurement stage so that it protects the interests of
the customer throughout the life cycle (i.e., so it does not overpay the contractor, but also
minimizes that risk that the system will become unsupported). Also, solutions provided
should be able to address the requirements breakdown (or flow down) to sub-contractors.
The breakdown of requirements for use by sub-system designers shares the freedom
provided by availability-based contracts. Solutions are also required to provide concise
algorithms so that the outcome will be tangible and measurable, and so the contractor can
implement and understand the requirements within their sustainment activities.
Any solution for designing such a contract should consider the variable level of
incentives for the contractors (through the term of the contract), along continual information
50
Figure 6: Design process of availability-based contracts
gathering that is done by both the customer and the contractor. Proposed approaches should
be capable of addressing statistical constraints like the dependence between different
variables. Moreover, a viable approach must have the flexibility to update the model
parameters using limited data in response to information added through the life cycle.
Optimum length of performance measurement or system condition monitoring for such
contracts, as well as the difference between assuming fixed-end-of-support contracts and
contracts with an uncertain end-of-support also need further investigation.
3.6 Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to articulate the quantitative and formal elements of contract
models and contract design for sustainment applications in the context of availability-based
contracts and evaluate existing methods to address this design problem.
It has been shown that existing solutions are not addressing the degree of freedom
provided by this type of mechanism, but they have the essential components of an overall
solution. For example, optimizing an inventory will not lead to the optimal availability;
however, it is one of the necessary steps in the solution. PBL provides the increased
freedom needed to utilize integrated solutions while incorporating the operational risks
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involved. Finally, special attention needs to be paid to designing meticulous and effective
requirements and performance measures.
By utilizing availability-based contracts, contractors introduce a high-level payment
and requirements framework, however bottom-up engineering models addressing the
underlying dynamics of the system and the integration of different sub-systems to meet
these requirements need to be considered. The feasibility space of contracts and their
requirements should be derived by considering the engineering systems with their physical
constraints and uncertainties. The integration of engineering design and contract design
represents a new paradigm called Contract Engineering. Contract engineering is not a
payment structure based on a range of outcomes, rather a careful modeling and simulation
of the systems involved is an important component. A Contract Engineer develops a model
that can be used for negation by all parties involved and can estimate the impact of different
contractual requirements on costs and incentives. Contract Engineering is a practical and
engineering approach to guaranteeing a win-win solution space and discovers the feasible
regions of design with lower risks for both the contractor and the customer.
This chapter gives program, procurement and acquisition managers’ valuable back-
ground for assessing the existing cost and decision making models relevant to availability
contracting. Using the insight provided, managers can aligned the models and methodolo-
gies they are using to availability-based contracting, i.e., determine what models can assess
the cost of guaranteed performance considering the integration of all sub-systems involved;
understand the operational questions that common methods are not able to answer; can
cost saving strategies be compared to business-as-usual practices; and what knowledge do
acquisition personnel need to have to assess different cost models, i.e., to perform better
negotiation and more accurate pricing?
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Chapter 4: Optimal Performance Assessment Interval Model
One of the key identifying factors of contracts is the role of the assessment time window
(also referred to as inspection time window or checkpoints) on the determination of the best
possible performance of the contractor. We model the contractor decision making with an
affine controller that uses previous data observations to make a decision. This assumption
is reasonable for most of the contractor’s cost modeling and operational decisions. The
affine controller model is then used in a simulation to find the best contracts with optimum
assessment window size.
4.1 Background and Literature Review
Finding the optimum checkpoint distances1 for assessing the condition of a sub-system’s
performance to ensure the performance of the whole system has been widely investigated
in high-availability computer server applications, e.g., (Szentiványi, 2005). Checkpointing
helps to switch the system to a backup system, so that the system delivers the maximum
availability while not losing its performance. The checkpointing should be short enough to
give a small downtime (“failover”), but long enough to utilize most of the system resources
for delivering tasks (Szentiványi et al., 2005).
Szentiványi (2005) provides a comprehensive picture of finding the optimal check-
pointing distance for high-availability server systems. This paper reviews a group of papers
with a variety of modeling detail. All the reviewed methods use queueing theory to model
1“Checkpoints” are the point that define intervals in which the system performs tasks, intervals are mostly
have equal sizes.
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the architecture of a server system and then aim to optimize the availability by finding the
best checkpoint.
Some researchers investigated the “optimal check pointing interval” problem in the
context of fault-tolerant processing systems especially with long-running jobs. Interval
availability is availability defined by the amount of time during which the system is in
operation over a finite observation period. In this area, there is more focus on the usage and
continuous demand. For instance, the amount of crude oil or natural gas to be delivered
over a finite period requires related platforms to be available for a certain number of hours
within a specified window. Although inventory backups usually cover short interruptions
in the production process, the loss of production for several consecutive days might cause
problems in meeting the sales contract, involve high penalty costs, and loss of goodwill
from customers. In computer and manufacturing systems, the guaranteed performance
during a finite period is sometimes a more important competitive factor than the average
performance observed over an infinite horizon (Dijkhuizen & Van der Heijden, 1999). In
this respect, the interval availability of the production system is often seen as an appropriate
performance measure in a practical context; particularly for order-driven manufacturing
systems, in which capacity planning plays a key role in satisfying contractual obligations.
Previous work on simulation for contract design has been done by Ferguson and
Sodhi (2011) under the assumption of fixed failure rate in which this assessment window
was not studied. Ferguson and Sodhi (2011) used a news-vendor in a single-order period
model in their simulation-based method to measure the impact of inventory level on the
availability of torpedoes under a performance-based contract. Their work explored the
secondary metrics that can be used as requirements to help the customer choose a better
contractor given their level of inventory. Jazouli and Sandborn (2011) used stochastic
simulation by assuming known distributions for logistical parameters to address different
aspects of operation over a life cycle. Their direct simulation method determines the design
and support parameters that results in a desired availability from the perspective of the
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Figure 7: Positioning of the work in this dissertation relative to other key works
contractor. Figure 7 positions the work in this dissertation relative to the work of Jazouli
and Sandborn (2011) and Ferguson and Sodhi (2011).
Other researchers, e.g., Schuëller and Jensen (2008), use Markov chain models and
consider up and down states for each component and try to formulate the conditions under
which a specific number of sub-systems (𝑘 out of 𝑛) are operational. Faults are assumed
to be independent, and subsystems are independent so that there will be a closed-form
mathematical representation of the total system availability, which can be optimized to
find the best checkpoints.
In the maintenance scheduling literature, the optimummaintenance intervals maintain
availability above requirements with minimum cost; however these intervals are not always
fixed, and they generally depend on the close-form representation of cost and availability
(Kim et al., 2009). Among efforts to address the uncertainty of the demand/failure rate,
Verma et al. (2007) use a fuzzy model to find the intervals of preventive maintenance to
optimize the cost of maintenance.
From the variability of demand stand point, there are also works in the preventive
maintenance space that optimize the scheduling of preventive maintenance to guarantee a
level of availability under the assumption of increasing hazard rate using closed form cost
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modeling (Kim et al., 2009).
Most of the above existing references formulate a closed-form formula that relates
various logistics parameters to availability and cost. Then they assume that demand is
independent (in time) and that the contractor has access to infinite resources to support the
system (no constraints on the contractor’s resources). In existing works that use discrete-
event simulators, the contractor is generally ignored and the optimization via trial-and-error
without a proof of optimality. Alternatively, to address the problem posed in this dissertation
we must consider stochastic demand that is not necessarily independent from time period
to time period; and the contractor’s behavior in response to incentives must be modeled
(i.e., the existing works do not view the problem from a “contract” engineering perspective
and therefore are ignorant of the contractor’s behavior).
4.2 Model Development
The problem we are looking to solve in this section can be written as
𝑁 ∗𝛼 = argmin
𝜃∈Θ
𝐶(𝑁𝛼) s.t. 𝐶(𝑁𝛼) = 𝐸(𝐿(𝜃, 𝜔)) (14)
In which 𝐶(.), the expected total cost of contract from the view point of customer is the
performance measure of interest, 𝐿 will be called sample performance, 𝜔 represents the
stochastic effect of the system, 𝜃 is a controllable vector of 𝑝 parameters, and Θ is the
constraint set on 𝜃, defined explicitly or implicitly (by mathematical programing formula-
tions). If 𝐶(.) was known explicitly, then analytical techniques including mathematical
programing could be usually be applied.
The model for the maintenance operation developed in this chapter uses a convex
optimization to design an optimal controller that represents the contractor decision making
inspired by (Skaf & Boyd, 2010). The Skaf and Boyd (2010) method uses convex optimiza-
tion to design a globally optimum affine controller for a discrete-time time-varying linear
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dynamic system, perturbed by a process noise, with linear noise corrupted measurement,
over a finite horizon. This method addresses the problem of designing a general affine con-
troller in which the control input is affine function of all previous measurements, in order
to minimize a convex objective, in either stochastic or worst-case setting. This controller
design is not convex in its nature but can be transformed to a convex optimization problem
by a nonlinear change of variables that comes below. What follows are the basic steps of
such design for a closed-loop controller design.
Considering that the system can be modelled by a discrete-time time-varying linear
dynamic system, over time interval 𝑡 = 0,… , 𝑇, with dynamics
𝑥(𝑡 + 1) = 𝐴(𝑡)𝑥(𝑡) + 𝐵(𝑡)𝑢(𝑡) + 𝑤(𝑡), 𝑡 = 0,… , 𝑇 − 1, (15)
where 𝑥(𝑡) ∈ ℝ𝑛 in the system state,
𝑦(𝑡) = 𝐶(𝑡)𝑥(𝑡) + 𝐷(𝑡)𝑢(𝑡) + 𝑣(𝑡), 𝑡 = 0,… , 𝑇 − 1 (16)










𝐹(0, 0) 0 ⋯ 0
𝐹(1, 0) 𝐹(1, 1) ⋮
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ 0
𝐹(𝑡 − 1, 0) 𝐹(𝑡 − 1, 1) ⋯ 𝐹(𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 − 1)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
which is (𝑚, 𝑝) block lower triangular. Then we can have
𝑢 = 𝐹𝑦 + 𝑢0. (18)
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𝑃𝑥𝑤 = 𝐺 + 𝐻𝐹(𝐼 − 𝐶𝐻𝐹)−1𝐶𝐺 (19)
𝑃𝑥𝑣 = 𝐻𝐹 + (𝐼 − 𝐶𝐻𝐹)−1 (20)
𝑃𝑢𝑤 = 𝐹 + (𝐼 − 𝐶𝐻𝐹)−1𝐶𝐺 (21)
𝑃𝑢𝑣 = 𝐹(𝐼 − 𝐶𝐻𝐹)−1 (22)
and
?̃? = 𝑥0 + 𝐻𝑢0 + 𝐻𝐹(1 − 𝐶𝐻𝐹)−1(𝐶𝑥0 + 𝐶𝐻𝑢0) (23)
?̃? = 𝐹(1 − 𝐶𝐻𝐹)−1(𝐶𝑥0 + 𝐶𝐻𝑢0) + 𝑢. (24)
The matrix 𝐶𝐻𝐹 is (𝑝, 𝑝) block strictly lower triangular, so (𝐼 − 𝐶𝐻𝐹) is invertible.
𝑃 is the closed-loop matrix, 𝑥 as the closed-loop state trajectory, and 𝑢 is the closed-loop
control trajectory. It can be shown that as long as the objective function can be represented
as a convex function of 𝑃, 𝑥, 𝑢.
Now that we can use an optimal controller to address the optimal decision making
process, there are several approaches that can be used to relate the event-based space to
the dynamical representation of the system (time-based).
Integration of an event-based system with a time-synchronous system for simulation
can be done in variety of methods and is one of the most pursued goals in simulation
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research (Brailsford et al., 2010). It also should be noted that this area of research is
not well developed and there are few existing works on synchronization of time-based
and event-based methods. The outcome-based orientation of our problem places more
emphasis on selecting the integration structure. The proper time-frame to evaluate the
performance is one of the key part of this dissertation. Meanwhile the nature of reliability
and maintenance actions are generally creating an event-based subsystem (Kashani-Pour
et al., 2014).
The goal of the analysis approach is to maintain the preparedness of the system,
which translates into insuring a minimum level of availability at all times. For the support
of a fielded system this requires management of parts in such a way as to minimize the back-
order and holding (inventory position), which will ideally be close to zero after responding
to demands in each period. The model involves the integration of the event-based structure
(demand generation) with a time-based controller, Figure 8. The time-based controller uses
the historical demand data in equal periods of time to determine new order sizes. Demands
are generated by a discrete-event simulator that simulates the behavior of the system in
time.
Figure 8: The translation of event-based domain of failure to time-based domain
In (Jin & Wang, 2011) it is shown that product inherent failure rate, usage rate,
and the size of the installed base have significant impacts on the equipment availability.
Equipment availability is jointly determined by product reliability, usage rate and the size
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of installed based which uses these parts. Here the same strategy is used to combine the
failure of multiple systems and derive the demand based on the failure of these parts. As
Figure 8 shows, the architecture of the analysis approach is based upon a discrete-event
retranslation of the process, however the controller only communicates with this model in a
time-based regime. Also the performance measurement of the system is a separate activity
that considers each simulation path and feeds the controller with a different objective
function based on the objective function in a time domain.
The selection of a demand distribution is of great importance. In civil infrastructure
(highway management) the demand is selected to represent the condition of pavement
or roads, which generally degrades with a slow dynamic, while for operational purposes,
systems under PBL contracts consist of parts with a variety of failure rates. Modeling the
demand distribution for design purposes has a direct effect on the optimality of the result.
In most existing works, demand is considered as being uncorrelated in time, however it
seems reasonable to consider a level of correlation in time considering the system level
dependencies that these parts might have.
4.3 The Expected Number of Failures
We need to be able to simulate the number of failures in each time interval. For repairable
systems, the number of failures at a given operational interval is one of the most important
reliability metrics because based on the predicted number of failures, proper resources
can be allocated. The most commonly used models for the failure process of a repairable
system are renewal processes (RP), including the homogeneous Poisson processes (HPP)
and nonhomogeneous Poisson processes (NHPP).
A flexible model (that has been successful in many applications) for the expected
number of failures in the first 𝑡 hours,𝑀(𝑡), is given by,
𝑀(𝑡) = 𝑎𝑡𝑏, for 𝑎, 𝑏 > 0. (25)
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𝑀(𝑡) is known as a renewal function.
The repair rate (or ROCOF) for this model is,
𝑚(𝑡) = 𝑎𝑏𝑡𝑏−1 = 𝛼𝑡−𝛽, for 𝛼 > 0, 𝛽 < 1, (26)
where 𝑚(𝑡) is the renewal density function.
The Homogenous Poisson Process (HPP) model has the constant repair rate𝑚(𝑡) = 𝜆.
If we substitute a time-variable 𝜆(𝑡) for 𝜆 we will have a non-homogenous Poisson process
(NHPP) with intensity function 𝜆(𝑡) = 𝑚(𝑡) = 𝛼𝑡−𝛽. When 𝛽 = 0, the model reduces to the
HPP constant repair rate model.
Probabilities of a given number of failures for the NHPP model are calculated by a
straightforward generalization of the formulas for the HPP. Thus, for any NHPP




and for the Power Law model:




Numerous work have used this assumption and developedmodels that addresses availability
as a function of demand size (reliability). For example (Nowicki et al., 2012) used this
model, which is based on the assumption that repair times are independent for calculating
the expected back-orders (proxy to materiel availability). It should be noted that NHPP
model corresponds to what is called minimal repairs, meaning that the system after repair
is only as good as it was immediately before the failure. There are many more possible
extensions of such approach which can be derived from statistical modeling literature
dedicated to repairable systems (Lindqvist, 2006).
In this work, we create an auto-correlated random values for the number of failures
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in time. This time series will be used as the demand stream to test the performance of the
contractors under hypothetical contracts.
For the 2-dimensional case: given a correlation 𝜚we can generate the first and second
values, 𝑋1 and 𝑋2, from the standard normal distribution. If 𝑋3 is a linear combination
given by 𝑋3 = 𝜚𝑋1 + 􏽮1 − 𝜚𝑋2 then
𝑌1 = 𝜇1 + 𝜎1𝑋3, 𝑌2 = 𝜇2 + 𝜎2𝑋3, (29)
so that 𝑌1 and 𝑌2 have correlation 𝜚.
Likewise for generating 𝑛 correlated Gaussian random variables 𝑌 ∼ 𝑁(𝜇, Σ),
where 𝑌 = (𝑌1, … , 𝑌𝑛) is the vector we need to simulate, 𝜇 = (𝜇1, … , 𝜇𝑛) the vector of
means and Σ the given covariance matrix. To use this formula, we simulate a vector of
uncorrelated Gaussian random variable, 𝑍. Then we find 𝐶 such that
𝐶𝐶𝑇 = Σ. (30)
The target vector will be 𝑌 = 𝜇 + 𝐶𝑍, and a popular choice to calculate 𝐶 is the Cholesky
Decomposition method (Trefethen & Bau III, 1997).
4.4 Discrete-Event Simulation (DES)
Figure 9 shows the general schematic of the closed-loop representation of the proposed
system. The availability and several cost factors are chosen as the parameters that the
controller needs to control. The demand distribution is derived from the reliability of the
parts and the controller action orders new parts for replacement. Control action is defined
as an affine function2 in which we are using previous demands to estimate the new order.
Making the control action affine makes comparison of different control policies that can be
2Affine in the context of nonlinear systems means the control appears linearly (where the nonlinearity
with respect to the state is automatically implied).
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Figure 9: Model integration architecture
described by affine functions straightforward, e.g., Model Predictive Controller or Greedy
Algorithms. These are common methodologies that use demand forecasting for planning
future inventory support. The controller builds a model from a number of samples in the
past and then predicts the next demand and the analysis window moves forward in time as
more information is gathered.
Because of the complexity and stochastic nature of real world applications, devel-
oping mathematical models of the system under study is far from trivial and assessment
of their performance is equally difficult. Models that are accurate enough to adequately
represent system behavior often cannot be analyzed using, for example, methods based on
the theory of continuous-time Markov chains on a finite or countable infinite state space.
DES is capable of representing the timeline of the life of different parts and subsystems
with fewer restrictions. One can add any number of variables and parameters to the model
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without the need to change the structure of model. DES provides a visual indication of what
happens to the fleet and each socket. Most importantly, this model provides a probabilistic
sensitivity analysis.
DES has the ability to indicate how a supply chain performs and behaves over time
when different rules and policies are applied. Testing different scenarios by adjusting
parameters and procedures means that supply chain performance and behavior can be
explored.
We use a DES model of the platform including its maintenance and we test the
controller performance for the system. The parts in this system go from operational to
faulty and then based on the availability requirements at any specific time they will be
selected for maintenance or replacement. Also, a model of the inventory is provided within
the same scheme, and different performance measures can be extracted from this model.
Petri nets are a DES approach developed for capturing concurrency and synchronization
properties. Petri nets are graphical representations and mathematical tools for formal
specification of complex systems (Haas & Shedler, 1986). Formal models like Petri net
models have a number of advantages over simply writing simulation codes or DESs. They
can be easily and automatically verified for deadlocks, conflict of conditions, catastrophic
states, and logical errors in reliability-based design projects (Dohi et al., 2006).
4.5 Controller Mechanism (The Ordering/Planning Strategy)
To model the behavior of contractor with respond to contractual requirements, special
attention was paid exploring the decision-making process. A game theoretic two-level
optimization problem was used before in Zhu and Fung (2012) with the goal of optimizing
the contract from the perspective of customer and contractor separately.
The control-feedback mechanism for availability contracts is based on the established
affine control model developed by Skaf and Boyd (2010). As shown in Figures 10 and
11 the model aims to determine the optimal incentives/disincentives in an availability
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Figure 10: PPP model for availability payment model
Figure 11: Affine controller for availability contract
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contract so that the customer can expect the best performance or availability given the
long-term budget constraint while the contractor maintains a steady revenue (with profit).
In public private partnership structure, the private sector, given the MAPs and the deduction
matrix, must decide their strategies throughout the operation phase, such as quality of the
construction, O&M plan and service quality, so as to maximize their profit and minimize
their risk.
4.6 Time Assessment Interval Optimization
The time window that customer uses to evaluation of contractor performance is of great
importance. However, most methods target long-term and steady-state performance of
simulators. The availability assessment window length is related to 𝑇 (the contract length)
by the following,
Avalability Assesment Interval =
Total Operational Hours in the Contract
Number of Assesment During Contract (𝑁𝑎)
(31)
Also, it needs to be noted that the systems under contract are not operational during
the whole contract time and in fact, the contractor needs to be assessed only during the
time that the system is operational. For this purpose, we ignore the times that the system is
not on-demand and calculate the availability and performance of the contractor based on
these operational windows. The assessment also will be performed during one of these
operational periods. Figure 12 depicts how the operation time is derived from the total time
and how it divides into equal assessment windows. As an example, two cases of quarterly
assessment and bimonthly assessment for a 1 operational year contract are shown.
The on-demand time is the time that the customer actually needs the system and the
preparedness or availability of system is critical whereas the out of demand times are the
time that customer does not require the availability from the system. In out of demand
times, the system can be available or unavailable, but it will not count for the hours that the
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Figure 12: Operational time and time-window assessment
contract requires the contractor to support the system. These are the times that scheduled
maintenance can be done without affecting the availability. The contractor’s performance
is measured in milestones throughout the contract length by assessing the performance only
over the operational time, and it will be awarded at the end of each assessment interval. It
seems trivial that larger assessment windows (larger assessment window size) will result
in fewer assessments (𝑁𝑎) also, there can be more oscillation in the performance of the
contractor. Also, if the time assessment window is too long, then contractor actions near
the end of the window will have little impact on the availability measurement (contractors
will be inclined to “drop the ball” late in the window because nothing they do will change
the result). Alternatively, if windows are too short, contractors are almost penalized for
the initial condition of the system and the inventory, and he has a very limited time to
learn the demand distribution. Alternatively stated, the size of the assessment window
will determine the sensitivity of contractor performance actions to different interruptions
and eventually affect the contractor’s degree of freedom in design. Optimization of the
assessment window size is a primary goal of the model discussed in this chapter. It needs
to be noted that in complex systems with high-availability requirements, each availability
assessment has an associated customer cost of performing the assessment, i.e., assessing
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the contractor’s performance is not free. This is another aspect in which contract design is
different from optimum warranty design which is usually focused on one agreement period,
with no assessment cost to customer (Wu et al., 2007). In Availability based contracts the
performance assessment cost can be an administrative cost or the tasks of evaluating the
level of availability at the end of each period (option period). For the sake of simplicity,
we assumed the same assessment cost for all different length of the assessment window
although it can depend on the other parameters (e.g. level of inventory as well).
4.7 Payment Model
Payment model is the second important factor of the contract the shapes the contractor











In availability-based contracts and models 𝑦𝑘 represents the outcome of contractors
decisions at assessment number 𝑘, which is associated with degradation and reliability
model of operating system and it supply chain network. It is also possible to derive 𝑦𝑘
without considering the reliability of the system and directly from a dynamical model
similar to Sharma et al. (2010). They used linear models to model road deterioration
dynamics. In their work since the contracts were long enough that the effect of the transient
behavior of the system can be ignored.
4.7.1 Payment Model in PPP Contracts
Depending on the nature of availability and performance measurement the payment model












MAP𝑘 −Deduction(𝑦∗𝑘) ≤ Budget(𝑘), 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑁𝑎














Deduction(𝑦∗𝑘) − Cost(𝑘) ≤ 𝜂MAP𝑘, 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑁𝑎,
where 𝑦∗𝑘 is the availability of the project at the end of 𝑘-th assessment interval; 𝑑 is the
effective discount rate per period (more generally the weighted cost of capital); 𝑁𝑎 is the
number of assessments during the contract time;3 𝜂 is a bankruptcy constraint; andMAP𝑡
(maximum availability payment) and Deduction(𝑡) are decision variables for contract
design for level one (public sector) problem. Given the detailed contract, the private sector
(level two) must decide on the best 𝑦∗𝑘 at the end of each assessment interval 𝑘 to optimize
its overall profit. To find the best payment plan (MAP) a search on a non-convex feasibility
space of the second layer will be needed.
Design space explorations using a variety of search methods and optimization meth-
ods is a common approach in multidisciplinary contract-based designs (Nuzzo et al., 2014).
In our method, every decision or solution needs to be checked for feasibility of physical
system realization. There are variety of methodologies that can be used for this layer from
heuristic search to nonlinear-mixed integer programing. Figure 13 shows a possible search
method to find the optimum MAP and deduction using a heuristic search.
3The operational time during the contract is divided into equal independent periods for performance
measurement. At the end of each period (timewindow), an assessment will be done on the level of performance
of the contractor. The outcome in each of these periods will determine the payment.
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Figure 13: Decision chart of payment model
4.8 The Impact of Penalty Coefficients on Contractor Performance
One of the main tasks of the contract design is to embed the right penalty rates for back-
order or holding in the payment model. These penalties are incentives to guarantee the
availability requirements while minimizing the total life-cycle cost of support of the system.
We can generally assume that there exists a base cost for each back-order of a unit and a
holding cost per time unit that the contractor has to pay. Conventionally, when it comes to
penalty items, the back-order cost is calculated based on opportunity costs and the cost
of downtime. The base holding cost is calculated based on the inventory constraints and
inventory operation.
In the process of contract design, the cost model of the contractor is mostly unknown
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to customer. But in outcome-based contracts, the customer can only shape the behavior of
the contractor with these adding incentives or penalties to these rates at the inventory level.
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Chapter 5: Case Study
This chapter presents a case study of a torpedo enterprise. The case study demonstrates that
using the modeling developed in Chapter 4, there exist an optimal availability requirements
assessment interval for a PBL contract. The case study also explores the best-contracts
space from the cost-risk perspective and determines the relative value of using an optimal
availability assessment window.
5.1 Torpedo Enterprise System Description
The case presented in this section is based on a case study and data from Ferguson and
Sodhi (2011);1 It examines the inventory of torpedoes for a submarine fleet (Enterprise)
managed by a contractor under an availability-based (PBL) contract. The design process
presented in this chapter determines the best assessment interval as a contract parameter
to reduce the total cost of the system and guarantees that inventory (materiel) availability
requirements are met. For our purpose, each item in the inventory is a whole torpedo.
Exercises and deployment require constant servicing of the torpedoes, and during testing,
if torpedoes are found to be defective, a complete torpedo is replaced from inventory by
supply contractors.2 Following testing, the torpedoes are returned to the fleet for use. When
the torpedoes are tested, if they are found to be defective, they are replaced from inventory
1Note, Fergusoon and Sodhi do not study the assessment window. They used a news-vendor model to
measure the impact of inventory level on the availability of torpedoes under a performance-based contract.
2In reality, sub-assemblies within a torpedo are tested, however, if any of the sub-assemblies are found to
be defective, the whole torpedo is not returned to the contractor/OEM but only the defected parts for repair
or replacement. The contractor/OEM guarantees the availability of complete non-defective torpedoes in the
inventory.
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and the inventory needs to be replenished by supply contractors. The flow of torpedoes in
the enterprise is shown in Figure 14.
Figure 14: Torpedo Enterprise Material Flow
There are very few works in this application space that report realistic data (Fincher,
2016). We demonstrate our method on this system using the data provided in Ferguson
and Sodhi (2011).3 In their work they look at the torpedo inventory level as an indicator in
competitive contracting environment to discriminate between bids.4 Ferguson and Sodhi
(2011) assume that the failure rate of each torpedo is reported as a constant failure rate in a
monthly unit. However, in our work we assume a distribution for number of failures with
different variance but expected value equal to the fixed rate in Ferguson and Sodhi (2011)
to simulate the number of failures over time.
The operational availability defined in (6) in Section 1.3.4 can be used to determine
the costs incurred on the contractor side that include shortage, holding, and shipping costs.
Back-order (shortage) cost is calculated per day of not having a usable torpedo available
in the inventory when one is needed. This could be considered the cost of an inventory
(or maintenance) worker’s downtime (the work that could have been done), or the cost of
penalties due to delays. Storage (holding) cost is the cost of storing one torpedo for one
3The extent to which the data from Ferguson and Sodhi (2011) represents a realistic torpedo inventory
management system is unknown, however it represents a published data set that can be readily used for
demonstration purposes. Note, we have added some reasonable data to the case study that was not originally
included in the Ferguson and Sodhi work.
4The realism of this particular aspect of the torpedo enterprise is unknown, but it is consistent with
published cases.
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day at the customer’s facility.
Table 5.1: Reliability and cost data for the torpedo enterprise from Ferguson and Sodhi
(2011)
U.S. Navy Torpedo Enterprise
Model A
OPTEMPO 1000 units/year
Total downtime penalty/Unit shipped $(28)(DTP)
Holding (Storage) Cost $100/item/month
Back-order Cost $1000/item/month
Failure rate 𝜆 = 10% /year
Contract Length (year) Max 5 Years
DTP: downtime penalty, shipping takes 28 days and its cost is based on the back-order in this case.
OPTEMPO is the expected usage rate of the products being supported by the torpedo inventory for a given
time period. In the case of the Torpedo Enterprise, this would be the number of torpedoes expected to be
received for maintenance, cleaning, testing and reassembly.
The contract obligates the contractor to support the torpedo enterprise at a specified
operational availability while minimizing the number of torpedoes at the customer’s facility
(the tire example in Section 1.2.1 has a similar requirement). In this PBL environment,
the customer/contractor interface is at the “shelf” where the torpedoes are stored at the
customer’s facility.
The customer provides the contractor with up-to-date inventory levels, which trigger
the contractor’s decision to restock (replenish spares). For instance, if a torpedo is found
to be defective during testing, a spare would be removed from the inventory to replace it.
To model the PBL contractor we use an affine controller that makes the order based
on the goal of minimizing the cost to the contractor by using the previous demand periods
(assessment intervals). The contractor seeks to minimize the number of torpedoes kept in
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the customer’s inventory by restocking the inventory as the torpedoes are used. In PBL
contract the requirements are focused on the final outcome (availability level) and they
do not limit the stock level directly and this makes the development of an inventory cost
modeling more complex as the costs are not occurring per item and harder to directly
connect to a contractor’s actions. Table 5.1 shows the data inputs for this case study from
Ferguson and Sodhi (2011).5
The contract model should address the two different perspectives of customer and
contractor. The customer has limited access to the contractor’s cost incentives and reliability
information and contractor has no role in the customer usage rate of the system. However,
from contract design perspective, we are interested in designing a contact from the view
point of customer considering including these uncertainties.
The next section describes the details of the stochastic simulation process to generate
the number of failures (demand in the inventory model). Section 5.3 explains the basic
maintenance inventory model in a general way as the base of the model in this case study.
This formalism is not limited torpedo enterprise and can be applied to variety of contract
from financial planning, human sourcing to work-order scheduling. Section 5.4 simulates
the torpedo enterprise including reviewing the relevant performance metrics and their
applicability to the Torpedo Enterprise case. Section 5.6 is the detailed description of
optimization-via-simulation for a cost-oriented objective. Section 5.7 considers the risk
dimension of the problem and reviews the feasible space from a multi-objective perspective
using Mean-Variance (Mean-Var) analysis from modern portfolio theory as a financial risk
assessment and optimization.
5Note, the cost of buying a spare (torpedo) is not included in the model. This is because it is a “wash”
between the cases compared, i.e., all cases consume the same number of spares. This case study also assumes
that the discount rate can be ignored, i.e., all timeframes are short.
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5.2 Stochastic Demand Simulation
In most of the literature related to contract design and reliability optimization regarding
performance-based contracts the failure rate is assume to be a fixed (i.e., constant) (Nowicki
et al., 2012; Ashgarizadeh & Murthy, 2000). Assuming a fixed failure rate helps produce
an elegant closed-form cost model and since most systems spend most of their lifetime
in the long flat constant failure rate portion of the “bathtub curve”, this is not far from a
practical condition in an ideal situation.
In this work we are using two different assumptions for the number of failures in
each time interval. First we assume a normal distribution with no co-relation in time and
we generate 1000 failure streams for each time period over the contract length. In the
second assumption, we look at failures with a lognormal distribution (for generalization
over lifetime) and with a correlation in time (to address seasonality, usage rate and common
cause failures). For the torpedo enterprise, since the failure rate is reported to be 10% per
year we are going to generate different demand streams with the same expected number of
failures per year to have a baseline for comparison.
Figure 15a shows five different demand streams (called scenario 1-5) over ten time
periods, simulated from the different distribution assumptions. The first scenario is a fixed
failure rate; the next four scenarios assume a normal distribution for the number of failures
per period (four examples, “sample paths”, are shown). Note that we assume corrective
maintenance and that’s how failure rate and demand are directly related. If the operation
is using predictive maintenance, then this number of failures could be sampled from the
predicted failure distribution (coming from a Prognostics and Health Monitoring Analysis).
In 15b, the five scenarios (five examples, “sample paths”, are shown) represent the case
where the number of failures is derived from a lognormal distribution with a correlation in
time to address seasonality in number of failures.




Figure 15: Number of failures simulation over 10 time intervals.
is never really true when time periods are short, due to seasonality and other effects) yields
a demand history that varies significantly from a constant.
5.3 Modeling of Maintenance Inventory Replacement
Different maintenance operation and logistics modeling are described in Section 3.2.
5.3.1 Discrete-Event Modeling
For a demonstration of the discrete-event model, consider a repair shop inventory. This is
a single commodity linear supply-chain problem. Where we assume that each failure can
be replaced or repaired immediately. The decision to repair or replace is being made based
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Figure 16: The inventory & supply chain model developed in stochastic petri-nets
The flow of parts in this system is as follows: a number of systems are running
continuously using parts that fail based with a time to failure distribution. At each cycle
(e.g., day) after 𝑎 failure events, based on the level of the availability (defined by an
operational availability requirement), the part is either replaced or repaired. In this model,
we assume a high availability requirement and we do not consider repair, i.e., the model
assumes immediate refilling of the inventory with spare parts. We also assume the system
will be available immediately after replacement. It should be noted that in reality not all
the demand/failures will go for replacement and some of them will go for repair, which




















































































Figure 17: The inventory & supply chain model developed in stochastic petriNets
As an order arrives, based on the replacement request, a new part from inventory is
needed. We used stochastic Petri-net formalism (Volovoi, 2006) to develop a preliminary
model of this operation and perform preliminary statistical data analysis (Figure 16). Petri-
nets are commonly used for performance modeling for processes that include stochastic
events. Figure 17 shows the graphical representation of the inventory and manufacturing
support model, done in CPN Tools (Ratzer et al., 2003). This discrete-event can gener-
ate failure data and maintenance inventory demands via sampling from time to failure
distributions for the system’s part.
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5.3.2 System Dynamics / Feedback Systems Modeling
We can formulate the overall performance of this model as a discrete-time linear time-




, … , 𝑇􏿲 and if the performance is not satisfactory the contract will be terminated
immediately. At any time the amount of spare parts available to be used in inventory is
(𝑡) ∈ ℝ .
The initial condition is assumed to be 𝑥(0). The inventory varies over time defined
by the following dynamic:
𝑥(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑥(𝑡) + 𝑢(𝑡) + 𝑤(𝑡), 𝑡 = 0, … , 𝑇, (35)
where 𝑤(𝑡) presents the demand size (with negative sign) coming from the failure sampling
of the system time 𝑡 in (35). The number of parts available in the inventory at time 𝑡 can
be positive or negative with 𝑥(𝑡) < 0 meaning a backlog of 𝑥(𝑡) units of the parts. The
demand for the part at time 𝑡 is denoted 𝑤(𝑡). The number of parts shipped to the inventory
at time 𝑡 is denoted 𝑢(𝑡). Figure 18 shows the order of events in a discrete time scope.
Figure 18: The inventory level at 𝑡 + 1, 𝑥(𝑡 + 1)
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5.3.3 Contractor Objective(Cost) Modeling
The goal for the contractor is to maximize profit by minimizing the inventory cost and
meeting the customer availability requirements targeting number of units in repair. We
assume the contractor addresses the demand in multiple periods during the contract time
(as oppose to models based on single-cycle, i.e., Ferguson and Sodhi (2011)). We also
assume the contractor addresses requirements by associating penalties to each performance
factor as what we call the inventory cost.
The inventory cost consists of shipping costs, holding cost and back-order cost.
The shipping cost will be proportional to the amount shipped 𝑢(𝑡) and inventory costs.
For positive inventory, holding cost will be ℎ𝑥(𝑡), and when the inventory is depleted the
backlog cost is given by −𝑏𝑥(𝑡). The total cost incurred in time 𝑡 is:
𝜙(𝑥(𝑡), 𝑢(𝑡)) = max(ℎ(𝑡), −𝑏𝑥(𝑡)) + 𝑠|𝑢(𝑡)| (36)













When the demands 𝑤(𝑡), 𝑡 = 0, …, 𝑇, are independent, the supply chain optimization
problem has a solution of the form of an (𝑠, 𝑆) policy (Federgruen & Zheng, 1992). When
the demand is correlated across time, and there is no general solution, Skaf and Boyd (2010)
use an optimal affine controller approach that performs better thanModel Predictive Control
and Greedy Algorithm. Moreover, they show that if demand has a discrete distribution
and can take on only a finite number of values (demand scenarios); the affine controller
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Figure 19: Distribution of contractor costs based on 10,000 simulated contracts
design problem can be reduced to a LP (linear Programming) problem and solved exactly.
However, if demand has a continuous distribution, the affine problem will have to be
approximately sampling from the distribution or by other stochastic optimization methods.
To generalize the results, we assumed a real-number demand sampled from a normal
and exponential family distribution (Weibull) with different variance to demonstrate and
evaluate the suggested model and methodology. The results of simulation of total cost for
a contract with 𝑠 = 2800, 𝑏 = 1000, ℎ = 2000, 𝑁𝑎 = 10, and 𝑤(𝑡) = 𝑁(10, 2) is shown in
Figure 19.
5.4 Performance Measurement
We look at the problem of contract design from the view point of the customer. The
customer’s goals can be described by a variety of attributes. System outcomes or functions
of the outcomes that we call performance factors that are generally defined by the contract
terms, and observable contractor decisions or outcomes of the contractor’s actions are the
focus of this work. However, there are two types of unobservability that the customer is
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facing: 1) the uncertainty of real costs (and their ratios, which defines the contractor’s
incentives) on the contractor side, and 2) in some cases the customer needs to measure and
define secondary functions of these parameters (e.g., operational availability as the ratio of
uptime to total operational time, or the ratio of demand to the inventory). Based on the
performance factors used by the customer, different measurements and calculations need to
be done with the system outputs or the contractor’s observable actions (Doerr et al., 2005).
For example, the availability as a function of uptime and the total operational time
is a popular measure for operational purposes. For inventory-level contracts (e.g., ven-
dor managed inventories), materiel availability and fill-rate are more common. This is
represented in the following equation where 𝑦(𝑡) is the availability (𝛼-service level),
𝑦(𝑡) = 𝐸[𝑞] such that:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝑞 = 1 if 𝑤(𝑘) > 𝑥(𝑡) + 𝑢(𝑡)




Quantity Ordered per period − Quantity Backordered per period
Quantity Ordered per period
(40)
Since this output is not convex based on 𝑢(𝑡) we cannot directly use the affine controller
method and a non-linear change of parameters or a bisection method is needed.
By measuring the back-order of the different parts and subsystems, we can directly
determine the availability of the whole systems and possibly infer the ratio of holding to
back-order on the contractor side. This makes the availability the most important factor
for measuring the performance of contractors to support complex platforms (Cuthbertson
& Piotrowicz, 2011). Other performance measurement metrics are possible.
5.5 Model Setup
Our formulation models the case where the customer makes the decision of assessment
interval without the knowledge of the real costs of the contract. As the result, the pricing
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decision and selection of performance assessment intervals are made by customer and
the contractor will design his strategy around it as a follower. In this section, we lay
out the general model that we will use in the game-theoretic (a one shot Stackelberg
game formulation) by a two-level optimization. The Stackelberg game is a strategic game
in economics in which the leader firm moves first and then the follower firms move
sequentially.
In this analysis, we assume the customer information about the failure rate is repre-
sented by a random process with the properties described in Section 5.2. We also assume
both parties are interested in minimizing their costs.
First, we assume that the total cost to the contractor can be written as:
Total Cost to the Contractor = Baseline Operation Cost + Penalty Costs






𝐶𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟(Φ(𝑁𝑎)) = 𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟(Φ(𝑁𝑎)) + 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(Φ(𝑁𝑎))
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is based on previous work in assessment interval modeling (Kim et al., 2009), in
which there is often a fixed cost associated with each assessment. This model also ignores
the money that customer deducts from the contractor payments as they do not help the












(deduction𝑘 + cost𝑘)􏿸 (43)
Where the contractor sets their incentive, model based on the customer deduction.
We use the model defined in (36) to set the contractor incentive in response to deductions
as:




𝜑(𝑥(𝑘), 𝑢(𝑘)) + 𝑔(𝑇)􏿸, 𝑢(𝑡) > 0 (44)
WhereΦ(𝑁𝑎) is the expected cost of contractor given the number of assessment. The
















0 < 𝑢(𝑘) (46)
𝛼 < 𝑥(𝑘) (47)
The 𝑥(𝑘) inventory level at 𝑘 from (35) and the constraint in (46) makes sure the inventory
level stays above the minimum accepted level of inventory during the length of each
performance interval. This constraint guarantees that the level of each level will not go
below the required minimum performance.
To address the first issue, we assume that there are some baseline values that the
contractor is facing, but these values or their ratios are not shared with the customer.
This means that the contractor’s cost of holding an inventory comes from the actual
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cost of running the inventory plus incentives for keeping a lower inventory, given by
ℎ = ℎ𝑎 + ℎ𝑝. Similarly, the back-order cost is 𝑏 = 𝑏𝑎 + 𝑏𝑝. The ℎ𝑝 and 𝑏𝑝 represent the
both the incentive/penalty design as part of decision making in the contract design as
well as in operational incentives of the contractor. We assume these values are limited by
0 < ℎ𝑝 < 100 and 0 < 𝑏𝑝 < 1, 000.6 To account for the uncertainty in ℎ𝑝 and 𝑏𝑝, we search
the entire feasible space:





𝜑 ∗ (𝑥(𝑘), 𝑢(𝑘)) + 𝑔(𝑇)) (48)
So the customer has to choose ℎ𝑝 and 𝑏𝑝 as part of decision making in the contract
design limited by 0 < ℎ𝑝 < 100 and 0 < 𝑏𝑝 < 1, 000. To account for the uncertainty in ℎ𝑝
and 𝑏𝑝, we search the entire feasible space:
ℎ = ℎ𝑎 + ℎ𝑝, 𝑏 = 𝑏𝑎 + 𝑏𝑝
such that
𝜑(𝑥(𝑡), 𝑢(𝑡)) = max(ℎ𝑥(𝑡) − 𝑏𝑥(𝑡)) + 𝑠|𝑢(𝑡)| (49)
The total cost of the contract with known parameters (ℎ = 1000, 𝑏 = 2000, 𝑠 = 2800,
𝑔 = 10, 000,𝑁𝑎 = 10) over 1000 stochastic demand streams (time series of failure numbers)
produces the distribution of costs that is show in Figure 20.
Type I(𝛼) availability is the number of times during the contract that the demand was
not met perfectly. It does not consider the percentage of the time in which all the failures
are replaced immediately with existing stock. Type II(𝛽) is considering what percentage of
the failure numbers are replaced, therefore the Type II(𝛽) is generally higher than type I.
The histogram of the Type I and Type II availability and cost shows the average
6These limits were chosen to simplify the numerical aspects of the simulation. The ratio (10:1) insures
that we cover a vast area of design space. Ultimately the important attribute is the points that optimize the
contract and the ratio of ℎ𝑝 to 𝑏𝑝 plays a bigger role and can be mapped to any other problem including the
Torpedo case.
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Figure 20: Performance Measurements in a single run for a single contract
Figure 21: Sample performance scenario in one contract, each performance period is
summarized by a box and the histogram is the overall performance of the population over
the contract period
number of three performance measures for the given contract over the simulate demand
scenarios. Figure 21 looks closer at a single contract with 10 assessment periods and how
the inventory level and demand availability oscillates over different demand scenarios. It
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is clear that since the contract has a good measure of prediction, the order size in each
period meets the demand and the average inventory level at each period is very low. Thus,
despite the low alpha and beta service level (materiel availability score), the contractor
minimizes the costs with minimum inventory level and back-order size.
5.6 Optimization-via-Simulation
In this section the Optimization-via-Simulation for optimizing stochastic discrete-event
systems via simulation is explained. The focus in this work is on the expected cost for
each contract using simulation to compare different contract’s performance. From the view
point of the contractor, there is no need to consider the effect of assessment cost since we
assume the assessment is done by the customer or a performance review board on behalf
of the customer. To isolate the important factors of contract parameters we also ignore
the effective discount rate to make the comparison between different assessment intervals
clearer.
Table 5.2 provides the parameters assumed to generate the 900 different contracts
that were considered to cover the domain of uncertainty in contractor incentive space from
the view point of the customer.











1000, 2000,… , 10, 000 Fixed 2800 1000, 2000,… , 10, 000 4, 6, 8, 10… , 18, 20 1, 2, … , 900
The effect of shipping cost was held constant (effectively removing it influence from
the analysis) in the model because we are only interested in the behavior of the contractor
in terms of reliability- and maintainability-related goals meaning how many items they
maintain in inventory to target the availability.
The problem in (48) of Section 5.5 is solved using different methods depending on
the particular distribution of 𝑤(𝑡). Since 𝑤(𝑡) is assumed to be continuously distributed,
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we approximated the stochastic problem by sampling from its distribution. Therefore,
the expectation in the stochastic objective was replaced by the empirical mean over𝑀
samples of 𝑤(𝑗)(𝑡), 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑀. And the stochastic constraints expanded according to the











max(ℎ𝑥(𝑗)(𝑡) − 𝑏𝑥(𝑗)(𝑡)) + 𝑠|𝑢(𝑗)(𝑡)|􏿸 + 𝑔(𝑇)􏿲 (50)
subject to
ℎ = ℎ𝑎 + ℎ𝑝, 𝑏 = 𝑏𝑎 + 𝑏𝑝




𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑀, 𝑘 = 0,… ,𝑁𝑎
0 < 𝑢(𝑗)(𝑘), 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑀, 𝑘 = 0,… ,𝑁𝑎
𝛼 < 𝑥(𝑗)(𝑘), 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑀, 𝑘 = 0,… ,𝑁𝑎
Where
𝑥(𝑗)(𝑡) = (𝐼 + 𝐻𝑄)𝐺𝑊 (𝑗) + (𝐼 + 𝐻𝑄)𝑥0 + 𝐻𝑟
𝑢(𝑗)(𝑡) = 𝑄(𝐺𝑊 (𝑗) + 𝑥0) + 𝑟
Due to the sampling procedure, the dimension of the problem increases dramatically,
but the problem is still in the form of a linear programming, and remains solvable.
For each contract candidate, 10,000 performance period were generated to test the
contractor’s optimal decisions over the contract length. A small group of of results are
shown in Figure 21 by the box plots of inventory level, failure rate and order size of
contractor. The box plot shows the of the performance of the contractor in each assessment
interval and its expected value along with outliers caused by large number of contract
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population used in the stochastic simulation . The histogram of the inventory level shows
that the performance of the contractor is satisfactory not only by the measure of expected
value but by the majority of the population of performance. However, because of the large
number of samples in the stochastic simulation there are also outliers in performance that
are shown in the left plots. In the rest of simulations, in order to illustrate the effectiveness
of our framework and model, the following metrics were simulated and studied, expected
annual cost for customer and contract along with expected availability measured by service-
level metrics.
We also look at the material availability based on the fill-rate definition in (40);
Moreover, each point that represents an expected value is addressing the annual performance
of a single contract design over 10,000 simulated contractor performance. Considering a
fixed cost per assessment independent of the inventory size (assessment is not testing and
therefore independent of number of units in inventory or fleet), the contractor performance
measured by the expected availability and total cost for a total contract length of one year
is simulated, and the result is shown in Figure 22a and 22b.
The calculation of expected annual inventory operation cost from the simulation for
900 contracts is done as follows:














𝜑(𝑥𝑗(𝑘), 𝑢𝑗(𝑘)) + 𝑔(𝑁𝑎) (52)
One can look at the performance of the contractor in each of these contracts for
worst-case scenario analysis or derive secondary objectives such as materiel availability as
shown in Figure 22a. The points of this plot are coming from the expected 𝛽𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 level
calculated by:














































































(b) Expected annual inventory operation for 900 contracts
Figure 22: Expected performance measure of contractor in 900 simulated contracts
As Figure 22b shows, the expected cost to the contractor for each of the assessment
intervals indicates that by decreasing the number of assessments (𝑁𝑎), which is the same
as increasing 𝑁𝑑, total cost can decrease. However there is a limit to this trend, meaning
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Figure 23: Customer Cost including the Assessment Cost
that after a certain number of assessments the amount of cost avoidance will diminish.
by assuming a cost for the assessments, customer will need a trade-off for the 𝑁𝑎 and
consequently for the assessment interval. This optimum value of 𝑁𝑎 minimizes the cost
Figure 24: Expected Availability level over number of days in each assessment
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of operation for the customer and based on the level of monitoring and payment this can
reduce the cost that the contractor incurs as well.
In the next step, we study the simulation results in groups, with each group having
same 𝑁𝑎 (number of assessments) or 𝑁𝑑 (assessment interval length), and use expected
value as the descriptive factor of each group, we observe that there is an optimum value
of 𝑁𝑑 or 𝑁𝑎. Since we are assuming the assessment interval is a customer decision we
calculate the performance measures given each assessment interval length. This can be


















In Figure 23 and 24, each point is a the average performance of 100 contracts that all
share the same𝑁𝑎, and each one is the result of 10,000 sample path simulation for different
failure time series. The Service Level is given by (39). Figure 23 is the 𝐸(𝐶𝑐|𝑁𝑎), represents






















Annual Cost to the Contractor [$]
Cost-Availability for 9000 simulated Contracts
Figure 25: Expected Cost-Availability for 900 Simulated Contract life cycle
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The total contract length is assumed to be 1 year. Figure 23 shows that for the
customer there is an optimum based on the cost of the assessments. Figure 24 shows
that from the availability perspective there is also a shrinking gain from more frequent
assessment.
Figure 25 shows the cost-availability relationship in the 9000 simulated contracts.
Each contract is represented with their mean of annual cost and mean of material availability
as one point on this plot. The group in red are the ones that result in expected availability
more than 90% and can be used for further analysis. Grouping the points in Figure 26 by
𝑁𝑎 allows the customer to choose an assessment policy, but the customer does not know
the costs on the contractor side. Figure 26 shows the direct relationship between cost and


























Annual Customer Cost [$] (with medium assessment cost)
Figure 26: Availability-Cost
We have chosen to present the majority of the results in terms of 𝑁𝑎 (the number of
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assessments in the contract) rather than 𝑁𝑑 (the assessment window length) because, 𝑁𝑎
more clearly distributes the results in a structured way (i.e., it is linear).
The results show that the optimum interval reduces the cost per period for the
contractor as well. The optimal point in the case of low assessment cost ($50 per assessment)
as shows in Figure 23, saves between 5-8%7 of the total operation cost of the customer
comparing to a quarterly assessment.
Using the proposed affine controller scheme for controlling the availability, we
observed: 1) there is a (globally) optimum assessment window length for assessing the
contractor. An assessment window that is larger or smaller than this optimum will not
benefit the contractor or the customer. However, the cost versus assessment window length
relation (Figure 26) is not symmetrical around the optimum point and adding more time to
the assessment window has a less detrimental effect than reducing the time (i.e., assessing
more often).
5.7 Mean-Variance Analysis
From a risk management perspective, the cost-risk analysis is another critical factor in
decision making. Financial risk, in federal acquisitions, is mostly associated with the risk
that the project costs more than what was budgeted. The term Cost Risk can be used to
refer to this variability of cost from what it is expected to be throughout time. The Cost
Risk (CR) can lead to performance risk if cost overruns lead to reductions in scope or
quality on the contractor side. Cost Risk (CR) can also lead to schedule risk if the schedule
is extended because not enough funds are available to complete the project on time.
A common method that can be used to determine the best contract parameters is
the expected variance of cost in each contracting scenario. The variance of costs can
7In Figure 23, for 𝑁𝑎 = 12 in the case of medium assessment cost ($100) the annual cost of contract for
the customer in a quarterly assessment is $43,312. This means 6.8% = (43, 312 − 40, 557)/40, 557 more
that optimum cost or in other words the optimum assessments can reduce the cost by 6.3% = (43, 312 −
40, 557)/43, 312 from the case of quarterly assessment.
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show the range of uncertainty at each decision point for the contractor. This risk will
indirectly impact the customer via the contractor performance and readiness. The variance
of the expected costs for contractor over 10,000 simulations for each contract is shown in
Figure 27. Figure 27 shows that by decreasing the number of days in each assessment, the
variability in the performance of the contractor will decrease, which means there will be
less variation in cost to the contractor. Figure 27 also shows that if the contractor looks
at variance as a determining objective, the previous optimum might not be chosen and
depending on the risk-taking attitude of contractor or customer the optimum point can be
changed. To find a trade-off between cost-risk and expected cost we use a commonly used
method in Modern Portfolio analysis.
Modern portfolio theory (MPT) is a mathematical framework for assembling a
portfolio of assets such that the expected return is maximized for a given level of risk,
defined as variance. In Modern Potfolio Theory, one models the rate of returns on an
investment (asset or decision) as random variables. Here the variance of the expected
total cost of a contract is taken as a surrogate for its volatility (risk). Economist Harry
Markowitz introduced MPT in a 1952 essay (Markowitz, 1952).
As ameasure of risk that contractor is dealingwithwe looked at coefficient of variance
of annual cost for each contract number. In probability theory and statistics, the coefficient
of variation (CV), also known as relative standard deviation (RSD), is a standardized
measure of the dispersion of a probability distribution or frequency distribution.













As Figure 28 summarizes, a risk-averse decision maker will prefer a situation with








































Figure 27: Coefficient of variation for simulated contract lifecycles as a measure of cost-risk
for contractor
achieve a lower variation in costs lower due to its lower variability.
It is often expressed as a percentage, and is defined as the ratio of the standard
deviation and the mean. Complementary studies such as Value at Risk (VAR) can benefit
from the distribution of each simulation.
Optimizing the expected cost alone cannot guarantee that the realized cost measure
will fall within a narrow range of its expected value when the corresponding variance in
failure and eventually costs at each assessment point is high. Moreover, just focusing on
the expected cost ignores the risk attitude (risk aversion, risk neutral or risk seeking) of
contractors, which may cause them to change their strategy during the contract period. To
investigate this case, we have carried out a mean–variance (Mean-Var) analysis on the








To measure this cost risk, we look at the coefficient of variance of the cost over
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Figure 28: Coefficient of variation for simulated contract for
the contract length. Figure 29 shows expected cost versus the expected risk in 10,000
simulated contracts. Mean-Var Analysis (MVA) recommends that the best contracts will
be on the Pareto-frontier of the curve that bounds these data points. The best contracts
can be selected and compared against the worst contracts over the same set of demand
scenarios and further analysis can be performed.
Since the assessment cost is added linearly it will only shift the mean of the costs
and it will not impact the variance of the costs. Therefore, the variability of the assessment
cost will not influence this result.
The result of MVA is shown in Figure 29, the hyperbola-shape area shown by the
data points is referred to as the ’Markowitz Bullet’. The efficient hyperbola (frontier)
of this curve is where the risk is minimized and the return (cost savings in this case) is
maximized.
We can trace back the points on the frontier and find the contracts that produce the
frontier of this group. Figure 30 uses the same group average to show the effect of the
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Figure 29: Mean-Var Analysis of 9000 contract from the view point of contractor
assessment interval on the cost-risk curve for the customer. The lowest cost and lowest
risk is highly desired by the customer.
5.8 Discussion
In this case study, a stochastic model is used in a hybrid simulation to search for the optimal
number of assessments throughout an availability-based contract.
A non-collaborative relationship between contractor and customer is assumed in
the sense that contractor does not share information (cost structure, reliability) or profit
with the customer. Since we are looking to design a contract from the customer point
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Figure 30: The Mean-Var analysis from the customer point of view
of view assuming an ideal contractor, we first assumed a range of uncertainty for the
operational cost of a contractor given different contractual penalty rates and assessment
intervals. We also assumed that the contractor will try to maximize its profit by minimizing
the spare parts inventory operational cost while respecting availability requirements. We
used an affine controller to model the contractor behavior, which uses historical data to
make an optimum decision in every ordering cycle. This algorithm has been shown in
previous work (Skaf & Boyd, 2010) to outperform Model Predictive Controller (MPC)
and greedy algorithms. Using these assumptions, a hybrid of discrete-event simulation and
dynamic system simulation was used to test 900 contracts each with 1000 failure time series.
Unknown information about contractor was addressed by assuming uniform distributions.
The customer will ask for a certain number of assessments (𝑁𝑎) throughout the contract.
The cost of one year of the contract was used as a basis for comparison between different
contracts. Data provided by Ferguson and Sodhi (2011) provided us with a practical range
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of the inventory parameters for a Torpedo Enterprise. The cost to the customer will also
include the cost of performing the assessments. Next, the cost-risk issues were addressed
by employing Mean-Var analysis. The coefficient of variation (CV%) of cost per period
was used as the measure of risk that contractor and customer are facing at each period.
Finding the best contract based on the cost-risk criteria is a multi-objective decision that
uses Mean-Var analysis data.
In the formulation of affine controller for the contractor, we used a convex cost
structure to achieve a global optimum, which minimize the inventory level and back-order.
This model can be extended to target a certain level of inventory (safety stock), order-size
limits, or an availability growth curve through time.
An availability-cost trade-off analysis was used to show the impact of a different
number of assessments including its associated costs. In our analysis, we assumed that
reliability (and thereby demand) is not a control parameter for the maintenance contractor,
however in reality, PBL is designed to incentivize OEMs to improve their reliability
(Guajardo et al., 2012).
To achieve a real-world application impact, it is assumed that the number of failures
in each time per period are not independent and are correlated to address the imperfect
maintenance, the seasonality of failures and other factors identified in field-data reliability
literature (Yigitbasi et al., 2010). The performance assessment and payment structure in
this work was based on extending a PPP modeling.
Using this stochastic model, it is shown that when there is a complete lack of
information about contractor’s incentive and cost structure and without requiring detailed
requirements, the customer can build a framework by assuming an ideal contractor and the
customer can still design a contract that reduces the total life-cycle costs.
The model aims to provide guidance for better design and negotiation of availability
contracts and is expected to help both parties understand the essential purpose of the
partnership, and seek their mutual interest more efficiently. The optimum number of
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assessments and time interval for assessing the contractor’s efforts is a key factor that
determines the constraints for a contractor’s design process. Longer assessment interval
allows for more fluctuation in the inventory level, but the prediction of demand can be done
more accurately by contractor. The length of the assessment window translates directly to
the length of time over which availability is measured for contract assessment purposes.
An end-to-end quantitative model of operation that addresses the contract parameters
(assessment interval, penalty and payment model) supports contract design negotiations
and can help both parties to identify the effect of each contract term and requirement on
the possible result of the contract (Wijk et al., 2011; Settanni et al., 2017).
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Chapter 6: Summary, Contributions, and Suggestions for FutureWork
In the process of contract negotiation and contract execution the objectives and constraints
of the customer and contract (e.g., the public sector and the private sector) are different.
The private sector has full authority to decide how to obtain a maximized long-term profit,
specifically, how to control the cost of maintenance while reaching a good performance
level so as to receive a better payment. Hence, the profit not only depends on the detailed
contract terms, but also on the private sector’s Operation and Maintenance (O&M) strategy
during the contracted life time of the project. The public sector, on the other hand, is trying
to incentivize the private party to sustain a good performance level throughout the contract,
given the long-term budget constraint.
This dissertation provides a comprehensive review of the elements of the contract
that can help the customer to incentivize the contractor without adding complex terms
to the contract requirements. Analytical methods to design maintenance contracts that
address the reliability of systems and supply chain operation are reviewed and the existing
gaps analyzed. The concept of “Contract Engineering” is introduced as the concurrent
design of contract and systems(Kashani-Pour et al., 2017).
A simulation-based method that aids in contract design and negotiation was devel-
oped and demonstrated. The method allows the identification of different features of an
availability-based contract for a variety of systems that are transitioning from conventional
labor and material contract to performance-based contracting.
The simulation method introduced in this dissertation uses different models for the
contractor and customer separately which are related through a payment model. The model
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aims to guide better design and negotiation of availability contracts and is expected to
help both parties understand the essential purpose of the partnership and seek their mutual
interest more efficiently. We can extend the model developed in this dissertation (i.e., the
controller design) either to target a certain function of availability directly or an availability
growth curve through time determined by enforcing more detailed requirements. In our
analysis, we assumed that reliability (and thereby demand) is not a control parameter;
however, in reality, PBL is designed to incentivize OEMs to improve their reliability
(Guajardo et al., 2012) and the effect could be captured in the model. An extension of the
model could be used, under certain assumptions, to determine the optimum contract length
for such contracts similar to Deng et al. (2015).
The new model has several direct managerial applications: using the model one can
quantify that the contractor’s prefer a larger assessment interval because: 1) more informa-
tion is more helpful for demand forecasting, 2) the effect of a few low-performance periods
on the overall performance will be minor (more tolerance towards demand variability),
and 3) there is more time and opportunity to compensate for a sudden change in demand.
The contractor’s preferences can be observed by assessing the variance of performance
under various assessment intervals (as shown in Figure 30). However, as the simulation
model focuses on the expected cost, a long interval will cause more oscillation in contractor
behavior and not necessarily help the contractor. Figure 26 shows that by increasing the
length of the assessment interval the variability in the performance of the contractor will
increase; this variability is measured at the end of each assessment interval. This variability
shows the amount of risk the contractor is facing during each period. Moreover, in this
work, the contractor does not change their optimal policy after each observation, but one
could consider such changes for some contractors. It is also clear that there is no need to
increase𝑁𝑎 excessively, and there is a threshold beyond which choosing a larger assessment
window size can result in any desired variability for a given performance level.
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6.1 Contributions
In general, there has been very little work that links engineering design to the contract
design (Sandborn et al., 2017). This dissertation represents the first attempt to formally
(and quantitatively) connect these two.
• The approach developed in this dissertation represents a new method for cost mod-
eling and pricing sustainment contracts. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no
previous cost modeling methods have considered the effect of uncertainty of contrac-
tor incentives to the customer cost models and contract requirements selection. This
method can be classified as bottom-up discrete-event simulation for cost modeling
for outcome-based pricing.
• A comprehensive end-to-end event-based model for modeling the operation, supply-
chain and the payment mechanism has been developed using a variety of methods
(discrete-event simulation and dynamic programing). This model covers the whole
spectrum from the physical layer of the system (represented in the stochastic Petri
nets) to the payment structure (based in public-private partnerships) including incen-
tives of maintenance agents and the contractor goal. Such an integrated approach to
modeling has not appeared previously in the maintenance and service literature.
• Dynamic Model of Contractor Behavior
Instead of a direct discrete-event simulation, a closed-loop optimal affine-controller has
been used to model the predictive and corrective actions of the contractor throughout the
inspection periods and total length of contract with response to availability requirements.
The affine-controller is used to model an ideal contractor that minimizes the expected
total cost of operating the maintenance inventory. Using this assumption the customer can
assume a range of uncertainty for the contractor performance and incentives and simulate
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the total-life-cost of the contract to find the best set of requirements, i.e., time-assessment
window. Usage of such approach in contract modeling is new.
• Payment Plan, Award and Penalty Design
The adaption and extension of “availability payment” concepts currently in use for civil
infrastructure PPPs to contract design and pricing for PBL contracts. The model develop-
ment in this dissertation explores and demonstrates the merit of the civil infrastructure PPP
approach for platform-level PBL and new acquisition subsystem PBL contracts. We have
focused on availability as the key required outcome and introduce a stochastic and layered
availability requirement into the proposed civil infrastructure PPP based PBL contract
structure.
• By assuming the cost for the assessments, there will be a trade-off that will provide
a global optimum for the number of assessments (𝑁𝑎) and consequently for the
assessment interval. This optimum value of 𝑁𝑎 minimizes the cost of operation for
the customer. An assessment window that is larger or smaller than this optimum
will not benefit the contractor or the customer. However, the cost versus assessment
window length relation is not symmetrical around the optimum point and adding
more time to the assessment interval has a less detrimental effect than reducing the
interval (i.e., assessing more often). In addition, this interval will reduce the cost-risk
for the customer as well as the variation of operational cost for the contractor.
• An optimal performance assessment interval was shown to exist that has a consid-
erable influence on the cost of the contract. The concept of an optimal assessment
interval has not existed previously in the maintenance service contract literature, but
has practical applications for defining contract options periods. This suggests that
there is a potential for defining newmetrics for contractors that can make availability-
based contracts more successful. Moreover, there could be new contract mechanisms
designed to account for the time assessment window.
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• A multi-objective decision making can benefit from the mean-var analysis to assess
contractors with different risk attitudes (risk-averse, risk neutral) with regard to
cost-risk and variation of cost at each assessment time.
• The methodology developed in this dissertation can help when a Performance Based
Logistic (PBL) Contract is being negotiated. The decision making team can use the
data provided in Mean-Var or Cost-Risk analysis and might not need to repeat the
simulation during the negotiation given the inclusiveness of the result state-space
provided by simulation.
6.2 Future Work
Since the structure is based on simulation-based search, nearly any type of payment model
or requirement (level or ramp) can be tested using the developed method. Different payment
mechanisms to address the cost variations can be pursued with advanced optimization
methods.
Future work can be done using a game theoretic, two-layer optimization structure
that models the interaction between the contractor and the customer under sudden changes
or interruption in the outcome, or to investigate the effect of sharing of information (PHM
information) on total cost. Including system design refreshment decisions as well as
requirement trends in time.
The optimization of the performance must be achieved under conditions that include
the different types of risk-taking attitudes of the contractor. The role of heuristic search is
essential due to complexities in the objective function and operation requirements. For
example, objective functions such as conditional value at risk (CVAR) put more focus on
the preparedness. The role of uncertainty in demand that is rooted in the reliability or the
systems requirements can be further investigated. The physical model that generates such
demand can become more complex.
Finally, the Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2016) estimates the current
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US weapon portfolio total acquisition cost, including buying and sustaining, will be around
$1.44 trillion—and the estimates are based on deliberately optimistic projections. The
costs will likely grow, as has happened many times in the past. A data-driven approach
can use publicly available sustainment contracts solely based on their base and option
period lengths and assess the role of program assessment periods on cost-over runs and
availability.
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Appendix A: Affine Controller Design
Consider a discrete-time linear time-varying system, which satisfies the following system
transition:
𝑥(𝑡 + 1) = 𝐴(𝑡)𝑥(𝑡) + 𝐵(𝑡)𝑢(𝑡) + 𝑤(𝑡), 𝑡 = 0,… , 𝑇 − 1 (56)
Equation (56) can be rewritten as:
























𝑥0 = (𝑥(0), 𝐴10𝑥(0), … ,𝐴𝑇0𝑥(0)𝑇
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where 𝐴𝑡𝜏 = 𝐴(𝑡 − 1)𝐴(𝑡 − 2)⋯𝐴(𝜏), and 𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙.
Then we consider a casual feedback affine controller, which has the form of:











𝐹(1, 0) 𝐹(1, 1)
𝐹(𝑇 − 1, 0) 𝐹(𝑇 − 1, 1) 𝐹(𝑇 − 1, 𝑇 − 1)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Then we will have
𝑢 = 𝐹𝑥 + 𝑢0 (59)





















𝑃𝑥𝑤 = 𝐺 + 𝐻𝐹(𝐼 − 𝐻𝐹)−1𝐺
𝑃𝑢𝑤 = 𝐹(1 − 𝐻𝐹)−1𝐺
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And
?̃? = 𝑥0 + 𝐻𝑢0 + 𝐻𝐹(𝐼 − 𝐻𝐹)−1(𝑥0 + 𝐻𝑢0)
?̃? = 𝐹(𝐼 − 𝐻𝐹)−1(𝑥0 + 𝐻𝑢0) + 𝑢0
The optimization problem is in general not convex in the design variables 𝐹 and
𝑢0. By a suitable 𝑄-design procedure, however, these problems can be cast as convex
optimization problems, and therefore solved efficiently:
Define:
𝑄 = 𝐹(𝐼 − 𝐻𝐹)−1 (62)
Then
𝐹 = (𝐼 + 𝑄𝐻)−1
Define
𝑟 = (𝐼 + 𝑄𝐻)𝑢0 (63)
Then
𝑢 = (𝐼 + 𝐹𝐻)𝑟














?̃? = (𝐼 + 𝐻𝑄)𝑥0 + 𝐻𝑟
?̃? = 𝑄𝑥0 + 𝑟
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Therefore:
𝑥 = (𝐼 + 𝐻𝑄)𝐺𝑊 + (𝐼 + 𝐻𝑄)𝑥0 + 𝐻𝑟 (65)
𝑢 = 𝑄(𝐺𝑊 + 𝑥0) + 𝑟 (66)
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Appendix B: Literature Review Methods
The strategy used to analyze the existing relevant work on availability contract design
and analysis was based on multiple cross-checking of models and contexts of applications
and literature. A variety of related literature was studied to identify contract models
or contract-oriented applications in the context of performance- and availability-based
contacts. Related works were identified through an electronic search of databases that
included: Emerald, Science Direct, IEEE Explore, library files and reference lists in
relevant papers. In addition, the literature search was extended to the US governement
websites (NASA, GOA, DoD, Defense Acquistion University) and consulting companies’
web pages (Booz Allen, CSSI, RAND, etc.). In this paper, we only consider works that were
foundational, quantitative and explicitly related to designing availability-based contracts
and sustainment models.
A structured approach was adopted to develop a framework for the assessment of
works from variety of literature from reliability to supply-chain management. This struc-
tured approach is based on the following questions: 1) What is the domain of application
or theory the paper is focused on? 2) What is the context of the problem statement in the
paper? 3) What type of contract is being addressed? 4) If the paper is in the reliability
domain, what elements relevant to contract design are discussed in the paper? 5) If the
paper is in the supply chain realm, what is the modeling contribution of the paper? 6)
Is the work from the view point of the customer or the contactor (or both)? 7) What is
the quantitative nature of the model? And 8) If an optimization method is used, how are
the constraints or objectives connected to contract requirements? In addition, there was a
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careful study of the quantitative problem statement in each optimization paper including
objective function, constraints, time horizon of the algorithm (finite, infinite) and the scope
of the model (fleet level or individual unit of the system). This approach is shown with the
data collected in this study in Table B.1 for a selected group of papers. The organization of
the paper is based on the framework shown in Table B.1.
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Table B.1: Framework for comparison of examples of computational approaches to availability-based contract design
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ACQ : Acquisition ; CM: Condition Monitoring; DES: Discrete-Event Simulation DP: Dynamic Programing ; FL: Fuzzy Logic; GA: Genetic Algorithm; LCC:
Life Cycle Cost; LP : Linear Programing; L+SCM : Logistics and Supply Chain Management; OR Operational Research ; PBL: Performance Based Contract; PM:
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